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SANCTUARY CORPORATIONS:  
SHOULD LIBERAL CORPORATIONS GET RELIGION?  
Elizabeth Brown* 
Inara Scott**  
ABSTRACT 
Spurred on by the Trump Administration’s aggressive deportation policies and open hostility to undocumented 
immigrants, the “sanctuary” movement has seen rapid growth across a variety of sectors.  With a clear religious 
foundation, churches, synagogues, and individuals associated with the sanctuary movement have pledged to offer 
housing, support, and assistance to vulnerable individuals at risk for deportation.  Some businesses have publicly 
expressed their support for undocumented people; we now see sanctuary restaurants, sanctuary homes (for domestic 
workers), and sanctuary unions.  But what happens if these businesses run afoul of immigration laws?  Can they 
claim religious freedom as a defense for their actions?  Following the logic of Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, we 
argue that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) could provide a shield for businesses, provided they act 
out of a sincere religious belief.  Given this conclusion, we discuss the expanded role religion has begun to play in 
business today, and how this may ultimately be a dangerous result for civil society.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In the first few months of the Trump Administration, the federal govern-
ment took steps that caused many immigrants to fear for their safety.  These 
steps included more severe punishments for immigrants, including a broader 
approach to deportation.1  President Trump signed an Executive Order paving 
the way for greater scrutiny of the H-1B visa program that authorizes highly 
skilled, foreign-born people to work in the United States.2  Since January 2016, 
arrests by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) have increased by 
nearly forty percent.3  ICE has increased its detention capacity and declared 
that all violations of immigration law, including driving without a license, may 
be grounds for deportation.4  Following a campaign promise to triple the num-
ber of ICE agents, President Trump signed two Executive Orders authorizing 
the hiring of an additional 15,000 immigration control personnel.5  
In many parts of the United States, a growing “sanctuary movement” 
	
 1 See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Ron Nixon, New Trump Deportation Rules Allow Far More Expulsions, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/21/us/politics/dhs-immigration-
trump.html (describing new immigration policies that, inter alia, expand definition of criminal al-
iens and speed up deportation); see also Alicia A. Caldwell, Illegal Immigration Targeted in New Trump 
Plan, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-02-
22/trump-admin-lays-out-new-approach-to-illegal-immigration (providing detail about new immi-
gration policy memos and their likely effects).  
 2 Glenn Thrush et al., Trump Signs Order That Could Lead to Curbs on Foreign Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/us/politics/executive-order-hire-buy-ameri-
can-h1b-visa-trump.html?_r=0.   
 3 Stephen Dinan, Free of Obama Restraints, Immigration Agents Make 28% More Arrests in Trump’s First 100 
Days, WASH. TIMES (May 17, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/17/im-
migration-arrests-38-percent-under-trump/. 
 4 Q&A: DHS Implementation of the Executive Order on Border Security and Immigration Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news-/2017/02/21/qa-dhs-im-
plementation-executive-order-border-security-and-immigration-enforcement.  
 5 Proclamation No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017); Proclamation No. 13,768, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/25/presiden-
tial-executive-order-enhancing-public-safety-interior-united. 
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offered support and refuge to this increasingly vulnerable immigrant popu-
lation.6  Religious institutions led the way, offering sanctuary spaces to immi-
grant families.7  Church leaders affirmed their religious obligations to stand 
with the persecuted and oppressed.8  Some cities and states declared them-
selves to be sanctuaries as well, taking a variety of steps to increase the safety 
of their immigrant residents from federal intervention.9  Driven by concern 
for the safety of their students and faculty, some universities also joined the 
sanctuary movement.10 
The immigrants potentially targeted by recent upticks in immigration law 
enforcement policy play an important role in the United States economy.11  
There are more than eleven million unauthorized immigrants, representing 
3.4% of the population.12  Two-thirds of them have lived in the United States 
for at least a decade.13  Unauthorized immigrants are most likely to live in 
some of the most economically vital areas of the country.  Fifty-nine percent 
of them live in just six states, including New York, New Jersey, and Califor-
nia.14  These unauthorized workers are part of a larger community of foreign-
born people, including refugees, immigrants admitted legally, and temporary 
residents and workers.  Overall, there are twenty-seven million foreign-born 
	
 6 See infra Part I.B–C.  
 7 See infra notes 32–39, 42, 46 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 47, 49. 
 9 Darla Cameron, How Sanctuary Cities Work, and How Trump’s Stalled Executive Order Might Affect Them, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2017) (outlining the functions of sanctuary cities and certain processes im-
plemented by sanctuary cities under President Trump), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/graphics/national/sanctuary-cities/; Jasmine C. Lee et al., What are Sanctuary Cities?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/02/us/sanctuary-cit-
ies.html (identifying sanctuary cities and states and describing basic identifying characteristics).  
 10 Tim Goral, Can Sanctuary College Campuses Survive?, UNIV. BUS. (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.univer-
sitybusiness.com/article/can-sanctuary-college-campuses-survive (describing forces pushing col-
leges and universities for and against the sanctuary designation); Joe Heim, Calls for ‘Sanctuary’ Cam-
puses Multiply as Fears Grow over Trump Immigration Policy, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/02/06/calls-for-sanctuary-cam-
puses-multiply-as-fears-grow-over-trump-immigration-policy/. 
 11 The extent to which this economic impact is positive or negative is debated among economists, 
though recent studies suggest it is positive.  See, e.g., Adam Davidson, Coming to America: Are Illegal 
Immigrants Actually Detrimental to the U.S. Economy?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 17, 2013, at 17–18; An-
drew Soergel, The Economic Costs of Immigration, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.us-
news.com/news/articles/2016-09-23/study-examines-immigrations-economic-costs; NAT’L 
ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
IMMIGRATION (Francine D. Blau & Christopher Mackie eds., 2017), 
https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/1.  
 12 Jens M. Krogstad et al., 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 27, 2017), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
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people in the United States, making up nearly 17% of the workforce.15  This 
percentage is increasing; in 2000, in contrast, foreign-born workers comprised 
only 13% of the workforce.16  This rise in workforce participation suggests 
that immigrants have a significant impact on business in the United States. 
Business owners, compelled by their beliefs, may want to join the sanctu-
ary movement in order to protect those affected by increased restrictions on 
immigrants and immigration.  Imagine, for example, a closely-held software 
company whose workforce is comprised of U.S. citizens, visa holders, and 
undocumented immigrants.  The software company may oppose the in-
creased enforcement of immigration laws, which could lead to the deporta-
tion of certain employees and their family members.  Although the company, 
like all U.S. employers, must comply with federal immigration law, it may 
claim that its religious beliefs encompass a moral compulsion to shelter its 
employees and their families from the increasingly draconian force of federal 
immigration policy.  For that reason, it may refuse to verify its employees’ 
right to work or refuse to cooperate with federal immigration agents because 
those refusals help the company to provide sanctuary.  The company may 
argue that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)17 effectively ex-
cuses it from complying with federal immigration laws that conflict with its 
sincerely held religious beliefs in sanctuary provision.18   
Does federal law support the idea of a sanctuary corporation?  This Arti-
cle explores the extent to which recent case law, including Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores (“Hobby Lobby”),19 suggests that corporations may have a consti-
tutional right to object to certain immigration enforcement policies that con-
flict with their religious beliefs.   
In Part I, we discuss the history and religious basis of the sanctuary move-
ment.  In Part II, we describe employers’ obligations under relevant immi-
gration law—obligations that form the basis of a potential conflict if an em-
ployer were to offer sanctuary to employees.  In Part III, we examine recent 
case law, including Hobby Lobby, to determine whether employers may refuse 
to comply with federal immigration law if doing so would violate a sincerely 
held religious belief.  In Part IV, we discuss logical extensions of corporate 
	
 15 Press Release, Dep’t of Labor, Foreign-Born Workers: Labor Force Characteristics—2016 (May 
18, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/forbrn.pdf. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012).   
 18 There are also potential claims under state-level versions of RFRA, but these laws are beyond the 
scope of this Article.  For an excellent analysis of certain implications of Hobby Lobby under state 
law, see generally Kara Loewentheil, The Satanic Temple, Scott Walker, and Contraception: A Partial Ac-
count of Hobby Lobby’s Implications for State Law, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 89 (2015). 
 19 See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  
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religious freedom and areas of future research and conclude.  
I.  SANCTUARY: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONCEPT 
The notion of sanctuary has a long history, dating back to ancient Greeks 
and Romans.20  In recent years, and often in connection with threats to im-
migrants or increased restrictions on immigration to the United States, 
providing sanctuary to people under threat has taken several forms.  As de-
scribed below, the most recent revival of a sanctuary movement is strongly 
rooted in both legal and religious traditions. 
A.  The Historical Origins of Sanctuary 
In its earliest form, sanctuary referred to the legal and physical authority 
of religious institutions to protect individuals21—including slaves22 and out-
laws23—on or within church grounds from persecution by government offi-
cials, or from private citizens seeking vengeance under traditional laws of 
bloodfeud.24  The protection of the individual could extend some distance 
from the actual church grounds25 and in some English cases also included 
secular jurisdictions controlled by local lords who were not subject to the le-
gal authority of the crown.26   Sanctuary might provide a short term period 
	
 20 See Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or a Dangerous Misinterpretation of an 
Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 747, 749–53 (1986) (describing both Biblical and 
non-Biblical origins of sanctuary); REV. J. CHARLES COX, THE SANCTUARIES AND SANCTUARY 
SEEKERS OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND 2–33 (1911) (providing history of laws supporting religious 
sanctuary in England); LINDA RABBEN, GIVE REFUGE TO THE STRANGER 55–69 (2011) (describ-
ing history of sanctuary from fourth century C.E.).  
 21 For a legal history of sanctuary under English common law, see generally Steven Pope, Comment, 
Sanctuary: The Legal Institution in England, 10 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 677 (1987).  A compilation of 
primary source narratives of individual sanctuary seekers can be found in Rev. J. Charles Cox, The 
Sanctuaries and Sanctuary Seekers of Yorkshire, 68 ARCHAEOLOGICAL J. 273 (1911). 
 22 Slaves were given sanctuary as early as the third and second centuries C.E.  See RABBEN, supra note 
20, at 49. 
 23 IGNATIUS BAU, THIS GROUND IS HOLY: CHURCH SANCTUARY AND CENTRAL AMERICAN 
REFUGEES 142 (1985) (describing practice of outlawry); KARL SHOEMAKER, SANCTUARY AND 
CRIME IN THE MIDDLE AGES, 400–1500, 119 (2011) (describing the relationship between outlawry 
and sanctuary).  
 24 Bloodfeud refers to the practice of permitting personal vengeance for harms done to individuals by 
the victim or his/her relatives.  BAU, supra note 23, at 135; RABBEN, supra note 20, at 59.  The legal 
right of sanctuary appears to have been related to efforts by Anglo-Saxon kings to mitigate systems 
of private vengeance.  Carro, supra note 20, at 754–56.  
 25 Cox, supra note 21, at 273.  According to one account from the Middle Ages, the sanctuary seeker 
would have to reach an area defined as “all the Church yard, and all the circuyte therof.”  Pope, 
supra note 21, at 688 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting COX, supra note 20,  at 119).  
 26 BAU, supra note 23, at 140.  
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in which the individual could settle his debts before returning to society,27 or 
could allow the fugitive a limited period of time in which to safely plead guilty 
to his crime(s) prior to leaving the country for good.28 
As a legal matter, the practice of sanctuary began to be abolished in the 
sixteenth century in France and England, and its remnants were formally 
abolished in 1624.29  Little evidence of the formal legal concept of sanctuary 
exists in early American history.30  Though early colonists may have viewed 
America as a type of sanctuary from religious persecution, they did not ap-
pear to adopt the legal concept into their common law, and even churches 
that were active in the Underground Railroad did not claim any legal privi-
lege for their actions.31  
B.  Developing the New Sanctuary Movement 
In the 1980s, a sanctuary movement grew up in the United States around 
the plight of refugees from Central America fleeing extreme violence and 
persecution.32  Numerous individuals and religious institutions took up the 
sanctuary cause as a religious obligation originating from the Christian com-
mitment to help those in need.33  While arising out of an expressly religious 
	
 27 M.H. Ogilvie, Sanctuary: Common Law and Common Sense, 83 CANADIAN BAR REV. 229, 237 (2004).  
 28 The process of confession and permanently exiting the country was known as “abjuration,” and 
was a practice often associated with sanctuary.  See RABBEN, supra note 20, at 62–63; SHOEMAKER, 
supra note 23, at 113; Ogilvie, supra note 27, at 236.  
 29 SHOEMAKER, supra note 23, at 170 (noting that the “groundwork” for sanctuary practices had been 
laid prior to the sixteenth century); see also Oglivie, supra note 27, at 229–30 (noting that while the 
legal practice of sanctuary was formally abolished in England 1624, scattered references to the 
practice continued thereafter).  
 30 See BAU, supra note 23, at 158–59 (noting only one instance of recognized sanctuary rights in the 
American colonies); Michael J. Davidson, Sanctuary: A Modern Legal Anachronism, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 
583, 594–97 (2014) (describing history of sanctuary in early America); Kathleen L. Villarruel, The 
Underground Railroad and the Sanctuary Movement: A Comparison of History, Litigation, and Values, 60 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1429, 1433 (1987) (noting early Dutch and English settlers in North America “declared the 
new land to be a sanctuary from religious oppression”). 
 31 Davidson, supra note 30, at 595.  But see Villarruel, supra note 30, at 1437–40 (providing legal foun-
dations for the Underground Railroad and a history of prosecutions under the Fugitive Slave Act).  
 32 See BAU, supra note 23, at 9–21 (describing development of sanctuary movement in the United States 
for Central American refugees); Lane Van Ham, Sanctuary Revisited: Central American Refugee Assistance 
in the History of Church-Based Immigrant Advocacy, 10 POL. THEOLOGY 621, 621–22 (2009) (describing 
the impact of immigration on jobs and the economy in the United States).  See generally Hector Perla 
& Susan Bibler Coutin, Legacies and Origins of the 1980s US-Central American Sanctuary Movement, 26 
REFUGE 7 (2009). 
 33 Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws: Narratives of Legality and the Politics of Citizen Interpretation, 62 TENN. L. 
REV. 899, 915–28 (describing religious foundation of United States sanctuary movement in the 1980s); 
Davidson, supra note 30, at 603 (“Eventually, the sanctuary movement boasted over 300 churches 
serving as sanctuaries, with as many as 2,000 additional churches providing logistical support.”).  Lane 
Van Ham places this advocacy within a longer tradition of “church-based immigration advocates” 
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tradition, this notion of sanctuary was distinct from the ancient Greek, Ro-
man, and common law traditions, focusing on the religious obligation of the 
individual to provide assistance.34   Although some individuals associated 
with the movement sought refuge in churches, the historic legal basis for 
sanctuary was generally not invoked as part of the movement.35  Rather, the 
religious basis for providing sanctuary became the foundation of a legal de-
fense under the Free Exercise Clause36 for individuals providing assistance to 
undocumented immigrants in contravention of immigration laws.37  Thus, 
for example, in United States v. Elder,38 ministers from the Roman Catholic, 
American Baptist, Presbyterian, Lutheran, and United Methodist Churches 
all testified that offering sanctuary to those fleeing violence was “an appro-
priate expression of the Christian gospel,”39 and this testimony formed the 
foundation for a First Amendment defense.40  
The New Sanctuary Movement (“NSM”), which publicly launched in 
May 2007,41 refers to the practice of providing immigrants with shelter, assis-
tance, and protection from possible deportation by federal authorities. 42  
	
basing their activism on scripture and Biblical grounds.  Van Ham, supra note 32, at 622–23.  
 34 See Carro, supra note 20, at 767–72 (contrasting arguments of sanctuary proponents in the 1980s 
with the historical, legal tradition of sanctuary).  Some have suggested the religious basis for the 
movement grounds it in a tradition of civil disobedience, rather than the more ancient notion of 
sanctuary.  Paul Wickham Schmidt, Refuge in the United States: the Sanctuary Movement Should Use the 
Legal System, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 79, 94–95 (1986).  
 35 Indeed, a Memorandum Opinion from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel con-
cludes, “[C]hurch sanctuary for criminal offenses was abolished by statute in England in 1623 and 
thus did not enter the United States as part of the common law. . . . We doubt the courts would be 
willing, even in the face of sympathetic facts, to hold that they were no longer able to enforce the 
country’s laws in the church sanctuaries.”  Church Sanctuary for Illegal Aliens, 7 Op. O.L.C. 168, 
170 (1983), https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/626831/download.  Though not legally required, 
state and federal authorities have displayed a reluctance to make arrests on church grounds.  See 
Davidson, supra note 30, at 616–17 (noting that federal law enforcement agencies in the United 
States avoid church arrests for sanctuary seekers even in the absence of a legal right to sanctuary). 
 36 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 37 Villarruel, supra note 30, at 1455–57; see also Carro, supra note 20, at 772–73 (rejecting free exercise 
argument in support of sanctuary in light of the fundamental importance of Congressional control 
over immigration); infra Part II.A (describing cases involving free exercise claims).  
 38 United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985).  
 39 Id. at 1577.  The direct quote was attributed to Bishop Fitzpatrick of the Roman Catholic Church, 
but the court noted that “this conclusion also holds true” in the other denominations.  Id.  
 40 Id. at 1576–77.  
 41 See Pamela Begaj, An Analysis of Historical and Legal Sanctuary and a Cohesive Approach to the Current Move-
ment, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 135, 145–46 (2008) (describing birth of the NSM).  
 42 See Marta Caminero-Santangelo, The Voice of the Voiceless: Religious Rhetoric, Undocumented Immigrants, 
and the New Sanctuary Movement in the United States, in SANCTUARY PRACTICES IN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 92, 92 (Randy K. Lippert & Sean Rehaag eds., 2013) (describing and defining the 
development of the NSM); David Gushee, An Ethical Analysis of the ‘New Sanctuary Movement’, 
RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Mar. 19, 2017), http://religionnews.com/2017/-03/19/analysis-new-
	
1108 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:5 
	
Those involved with the movement include churches, private citizens, busi-
nesses, cities, and even entire states.43  Though it shares similar roots with the 
sanctuary movement of the 1980s, the NSM is notably different in that it fo-
cuses not on the extreme violence and danger the deported would face if re-
turned to their home countries, but on the tearing apart of families and up-
rooting of people from communities and lives that they had built in the United 
States.44  Many of the public stories about the NSM have focused on parents 
being separated from children, or individuals brought to the country as chil-
dren themselves who face deportation to a country with which they have little 
or no connection.45   Another key difference between the two movements lies 
in the movement practices: in the 1980s, sanctuary activists focused on short-
term protection and transportation for vulnerable individuals; the NSM’s 
broader base of activities includes political activism, advocacy for individuals 
in legal proceedings, and support for reform of national immigration laws.46  
Like the earlier sanctuary movement, however, the NSM’s roots include ex-
plicitly religious grounds, with movement leaders often pointing to Biblical 
scriptures that exhort Christians to care for “the stranger.”47  
C.  Reviving Sanctuary in the Trump Era  
After the 2016 election of Donald Trump, whose campaign was marked 
by significant antipathy toward illegal immigrants, particularly those enter-
ing the country from Mexico,48 the number of religious institutions in the 
	
sanctuary-movement/ (describing religious basis of the NSM, as well as how churches can partici-
pate); Puck Lo, Inside the New Sanctuary Movement That’s Protecting Immigrants from ICE, NATION (May 
6, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/inside-new-sanctuary-movement-thats-protecting-
immigrants-ice/ (describing actions of churches involved in the NSM).  
 43 See supra notes 9–10, 42.   
 44 Caminero-Santangelo, supra note 42, at 96–97.  
 45 Id. at 97–98. 
 46 Grace Yukich, ‘I Didn’t Know if This Was Sanctuary’: Strategic Adaptation in the US New Sanctuary Movement, 
in SANCTUARY PRACTICES IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 106, 108 (Randy K. Lippert & 
Sean Rehaag eds., 2013). 
 47 Caminero-Santangelo, supra note 42, at 99 (“The stranger who dwells among you shall be to you 
as one born among you, and you shall love him as yourself; for you were strangers in the land of 
Egypt.” (citing Leviticus 19:33)); see also Resources, SANCTUARY NOT DEPORTATION, 
http://www.sanctuarynotdeportation.org/resources.html (last visited July 20, 2017) (providing 
links to statements on sanctuary from the Episcopal Diocese of Los Angeles, the Oregon Lutheran 
Synod, the U.S. Presbyterian Church, the Unitarian Universalist Association and United Church 
of Christ, the United Methodist Church, and the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism); 
Rose Cuison Villazor, What is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 S.M.U. L. REV. 133, 144–47 (2008) (describing the 
role of churches in the development and operation of the NSM).  
 48 See Carroll Doherty, 5 Facts About Trump Supporters’ Views of Immigration, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 25, 
2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/25/5-facts-about-trump-supporters-
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sanctuary movement doubled.49  In March 2017, more than 800 religious 
congregations in the United States were engaged in the NSM, compared 
with approximately 400 before the election.50  At the same time, the NSM 
encompasses a wide and growing secular component.  As the Trump admin-
istration increases the rate of deportation and widens the scope of vulnerable 
individuals to include those who have committed no serious crime and may 
have young children and large families in the United States,51 activism on be-
half of immigrants has increased.52  High profile efforts include sanctuary cit-
ies, which limit cooperation of local police with federal immigration authori-
ties,53 and which have been a particular target of the Trump administration.54  
	
views-of-immigration (finding that 66% of Trump supporters view immigration as a “very big prob-
lem” in the U.S., 79% support building a border wall with Mexico, and a majority of those forced 
to choose between border security and creating a path for undocumented immigrants to become 
citizens choose stronger enforcement and security); see also Julie Hirschfeld Davis et al., Trump to 
Order Mexican Border Wall and Curtail Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/01/24/us/politics/wall-border-trump.html (noting that the proposed border 
wall between the U.S. and Mexico was a “signature promise” of Trump’s campaign). 
 49 Dwyer Gunn, The Sanctuary Movement: How Religious Groups are Sheltering the Undocumented, GUARDIAN 
(Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb-/08/sanctuary-movement-un-
documented-immigrants-america-trump-obama.   
 50 Id. 
 51 See Peter Baker & Ron Nixon, Trump Proposal Would Deport More Immigrants Immediately, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19/us/politics/trump-immigration-depor-
tations.html?action=click&contentCollection=Politics&module=RelatedCoverage&re-
gion=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article (describing the change from Obama policies, which focused 
on “removing serious criminals” to Trump directives, which include an expansion of “expedited 
removals” of anyone who had been in the country for up to two years); Brian Bennett & Amy Fiscus, 
What You Need to Know About the Trump Administration’s New Immigrant Rules, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-immigration-explained-20170222-story.html 
(detailing new immigration restrictions under the Trump Administration and describing those tar-
geted for deportation).  
 52 See, e.g., Lori Weisberg, Anti-Trump Activists Rally in Support of Immigrants, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. 
(Feb. 18, 2017), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/immigration/sd-me-march-immi-
grants-20170216-story.html (reporting on a pro-immigration rally in San Diego); see also Caitlin 
Dickson, ‘Now We Have a Bogeyman’: Trump Helps Immigration Activists Raise Awareness of Deportation Issues, 
YAHOO NEWS (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.yahoo.com/news/now-we-have-a-bogeyman-trump-
helps-immigration-activists-raise-awareness-on-deportation-issues-230331118.html (detailing how 
the election of Donald Trump has spread awareness of immigration issues). 
 53 See supra note 9; Janell Ross, 6 Big Things to Know About Sanctuary Cities, WASH. POST. (July 8, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/07/08/4-big-things-to-know-about-
sanctuary-cities-and-illegal-immigration/; Tessa Stuart, How Sanctuary Cities are Plotting to Resist 
Trump, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/how-
sanctuary-cities-are-plotting-to-resist-trump-w453239. 
 54 Priscilla Alvarez, Trump Cracks Down on Sanctuary Cities, ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.theat-
lantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trump-crack-down-sanctuary-city/514427/; see also Press Re-
lease, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks on Sanctuary Jurisdictions 
(Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech-/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-re-
marks-sanctuary-jurisdictions (seeking compliance by states and cities to comply with federal immi-
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Within the business community, a group calling itself “sanctuary restau-
rants” sprang up to provide signage, advice, and networking for likeminded 
businesses that want to publicly declare their support for their often largely 
immigrant workforce. 55   Meanwhile, the National Health Care Union 
dubbed itself a “sanctuary union.”56  Another group sought to offer “sanctu-
ary homes” to the variety of employees that may work within private homes, 
including child care, health care, and housekeeping workers.57  In May 2017, 
Oakland became the first city in the United States to pass a resolution estab-
lishing “sanctuary workplaces” in which “workers are respected and not 
threatened or discriminated against based on their immigration status,” 
though the legal import of that designation is far from clear.58 
While the NSM retains a strong religious tradition, there is little confi-
dence within the movement that the religious conviction of participants will 
necessarily translate into legal protection.  As a memo from the General 
Counsel of the United Church of Christ warns, “It is a felony for an organi-
zation or individual to conceal, harbor, shield from detection, or transport 
an undocumented immigrant. . . . Individuals, such as congregation mem-
bers, who are providing sanctuary services on behalf of a church may be 
prosecuted individually and receive fines and prison sentences.”59  
	
gration policies).  On April 25, 2017, a preliminary injunction blocked Trump’s executive order re-
stricting the flow of federal funds to sanctuary cities.  Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 
3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017); see also Vivian Yee, Judge Blocks Trump Effort to Withhold Money from Sanctuary 
Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/us/judge-blocks-
trump-sanctuary-cities.html (detailing the contents of the preliminary injunction).  
 55 Octavio Blanco, Sanctuary Restaurants Vow to Protect Undocumented Workers, CNN (Feb. 21, 2017), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/02/20/news/economy/sanctuary-restaurants; Chase Purdy, “Sanc-
tuary Restaurants” Are Popping Up in the US to Protect Their Immigrant Workers from Trump, QUARTZ (Jan. 
26, 2017), https://qz.com/894817/sanctuary-restaurants-in-the-us-are-vowing-to-protect-their-
immigrant-workers-from-deportation-under-trump.  
 56 Dan Cadman, Healthcare Workers Union Declares Itself a Sanctuary, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Apr. 17, 
2017), http://cis.org/cadman/healthcare-workers-union-declares-itself-sanctuary; Porfirio Quin-
tano, Health Care Workers Bring Sanctuary Movement into the Union, LABORNOTES (Apr. 13, 2017), 
http://labornotes.org/2017/04/health-care-workers-bring-sanctuary-movement-union.  
 57 Clio Chang, Donald Trump and the Rise of the “Sanctuary Home”, NEW REPUBLIC (May 4, 2017), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/142490/donald-trump-rise-sanctuary-home; About, SANCTUARY 
HOMES, https://mysanctuaryhome.us/about-1/ (last visited July 20, 2017). 
 58 Riley McDermid, Oakland Passes Resolution Asking Businesses to Create Sanctuary Workplaces, S.F. BUS. 
TIMES (Apr. 19, 2017), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2017/04/19/oakland-
immigration-sanctuary-workplaces.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59 Memorandum from United Church of Christ Office of the General Counsel to Conference Minis-
ters 4 (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.ctucc.org/files/ct+documents/justice+ministries/le-
gal_risks_sanctuary_2017.pdf.  Similar warnings can be found in other toolkits and FAQs intended 
for individuals and organizations intending to participate in the NSM.  See also Center for Human 
Rights and Constitutional Law, New Sanctuary Movement Legal Toolkit 8, 
http://www.rac.org/sites/default/files/Center%20for%20Human%20Rights%20and%20Con-
stitututional%20Law%20Sanctuary%20Toolkit.pdf (“In short, someone merely providing shelter 
	
May 2018] SANCTUARY CORPORATIONS 1111 
	
II.  IMMIGRATION LAWS AND EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS 
Federal law broadly prohibits individuals and employers from a variety 
of interactions with individuals illegally in the country, and imposes obliga-
tions on employers to report certain information regarding employee immi-
gration status.  In this Part, we describe the legal boundaries of these laws, 
and the expansive way they have been interpreted.  
A.  Harbor, Shelter, and Encourage  
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),60 it is a crime for 
any person to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection in any place, includ-
ing any building or means of transportation, any alien who has come to, en-
tered, or remains in the United States in violation of law.61  This provision 
includes harboring an alien who entered the United States legally but has 
since lost legal status. 62  The INA also prohibits “encourag[ing] . . . an alien 
to . . . reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact 
that such . . . residence will be in violation of the law[.]”63  
The term “harboring” as used in the INA has not been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court, and the circuit courts remain divided as to the breadth of its 
scope.64  The most expansive definition, which has been adopted by the 
Ninth Circuit, is illustrated in United States v. Acosta de Evans.65  In this case, the 
court found the plaintiff, Margarita Acosta de Evans, had “harbored” an un-
documented relative by allowing the relative to stay with her for a period of 
two months, during which time de Evans knew that her relative was undoc-
umented and in the country illegally.66  The court explicitly rejected the 
proposition that, because de Evans had not made any efforts to conceal her 
	
to an immigrant known to be illegally present could result in a prosecution.”); American Civil Lib-
erties Union, Sanctuary Congregations and Harboring FAQ 1 (April 13, 2017), http://www.sanc-
tuarynotdeportation.org/uploads/7/6/9/1/76912017/sanctuary_faq_4_13_2017.pdf (“Federal 
courts across the country have approached convicting a person of harboring in different ways, and 
have applied different standards.  Whether or not a certain action places you at risk for a criminal 
conviction depends somewhat on where you are in the country.”).  
 60 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012). 
 61 Id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)–(iv). 
 62 Id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
 63 Id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).  
 64 For an excellent overview of harboring case law, see Emily Breslin, Note, The Road to Liability is Paved with 
Humanitarian Intentions: Criminal Liability for Housing Undocumented People Under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), 
11 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 214, 231–35 (2009).  Note that this analysis precedes the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s decision in United States v. Costello.  See infra notes 69–74 and accompanying text.  
 65 United States v. Acosta de Evans, 531 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1976).  
 66 Id. at 429.  
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relative from authorities, her act in providing a place to live could not con-
stitute harboring.  Relying on dictionary definitions of the term harbor, the 
court concluded “The purpose of the section is to keep unauthorized aliens 
from entering or remaining in the country. . . . We believe that this purpose 
is best effectuated by construing ‘harbor’ to mean ‘afford shelter to’”67—a 
phrase that the court did not believe required intent or effort to conceal or 
shield the undocumented individual from detection.68    
A narrower definition of harboring was recently adopted by the Seventh 
Circuit.  In United States v. Costello,69 the court considered a case in which a 
woman was found guilty of harboring because she provided a place for her 
boyfriend to live for approximately six months, though she knew him to be 
in the country illegally.70  The court concluded that interpreting the term 
“harbor” to include simply providing a place to stay was inconsistent with 
the legislative history, meaning, and language of the statute.71  Rather, the 
term harbor must include something more, such as intent to provide a known 
undocumented individual with “a secure haven, a refuge, a place to stay in 
which the authorities are unlikely to be seeking him.”72  Ultimately, without 
facts tending to show that the defendant had concealed or shielded the un-
documented individual from detection, it could not find the defendant had 
“harbored” him.73  
Part of the Costello court’s rationale was that previous cases, including 
Acosta de Evans, that seemingly applied a more expansive definition of harbor-
ing, did so under circumstances tending to show a greater pattern of aid to 
undocumented individuals.74  Under such fact patterns, providing a place to 
	
 67 Id. at 430.  
 68 Id. 
 69 United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2012).  
 70 Id. at 1041–42.  
 71 Id. at 1043–47.  
 72 Id. at 1050. 
 73 Id.  Interestingly, in United States v. You, the Ninth Circuit upheld a jury instruction requiring proof 
that defendants had acted with “the purpose of avoiding [the aliens’] detection by immigration au-
thorities,” which it equated with a mens rea requirement that the defendant had intended to violate 
immigration laws.  382 F.3d 958, 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis and alternation in original). 
 74 Costello, 666 F.3d at 1049–50.  For example, in United States v. Zheng, a restaurant owner provided 
housing for undocumented employees, but also worked them over seventy hours a week, never 
checked their immigration records, did not pay Social Security or federal taxes for the employees, 
and under-reported wages, personal income and business income on tax returns.  306 F.3d 1080, 
1083 (11th Cir. 2002).  In United States v. Kim, the owner of a garment manufacturing business took 
steps to conceal undocumented workers he employed, including instructing them to obtain false 
documentation, to testify falsely to the Immigration and Nationalization Service, and to submit 
false I-9 forms.  193 F.3d 567, 574–75 (2d Cir. 1999).  The Second Circuit’s definition of harboring 
“encompasses conduct tending substantially to facilitate an alien’s remaining in the United States 
illegally and to prevent government authorities from detecting his unlawful presence.”  Id. at 574.  
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stay may turn into harboring even if the defendant makes no specific effort 
to conceal or deceive authorities.  This suggests that harboring may be 
judged according to the court’s assessment of the ultimate motive of the de-
fendant: if the defendant had a desire to shield an undocumented individual 
from detection, the court might find her actions to constitute harboring, even 
if her actions do not reflect such a desire.  Thus, a defendant who has a strong 
moral and/or religious conviction that deportation is wrong, and a professed 
desire to aid undocumented individuals, could be guilty of harboring even if 
she announced on national television that she was providing sanctuary to 
certain individuals in her basement.  In such a case, the crime would be the 
desire to assist and moral conviction that the law is wrong, not the conduct, or 
even the intent to engage in such conduct.75 
The Seventh Circuit appears to have left open this possibility when it 
described a hypothetical in which an employer provides cheap housing for 
its undocumented employees, knowing they are in the country illegally and 
may be unable to secure their own housing, either because of the cost or their 
illegal status.  This situation would constitute harboring, the court notes, be-
cause the act of providing a place to stay in these cases is bound up with the 
employer’s knowledge that the employees are illegal immigrants:   
The owner is harboring these illegal aliens in the sense of taking strong 
measures to keep them here.  Yet there may be no effort at concealment or 
shielding from detection . . . . It is nonetheless harboring in an appropriate 
sense because the illegal status of the alien is inseparable from the decision 
to provide housing—it is a decision to provide a refuge for an illegal alien 
because he’s an illegal alien.76 
The court goes on to suggest that the accused in the Costello case offered her 
boyfriend a place to stay without regard to his legal status, and ultimately 
provided him little benefit in terms of evading authorities.77  The hypothet-
ical employer, on the other hand, “provides an inducement” to the employ-
ees;78 while the employer’s offer of housing may not reflect an intent to conceal 
the employees, because authorities have limited resources with which to track 
them down, the employer’s conduct is somehow more nefarious.  Perhaps 
more importantly, though the court does not say it directly, the employer’s 
relationship with the employee is presumably based on the employee’s illegal 
status, not his job skills.79 
	
 75 Criminalizing the moral conviction that deportation is wrong, rather than the intent to conceal or 
actual conduct to conceal undocumented individuals, looks very much like criminalizing the religious 
belief, rather than its expression.  This type of state action would run counter to the very essence of 
free expression protection.  
 76 Costello, 666 F.3d at 1045 (emphasis in original).  
 77 Id. at 1045–46.  
 78  Id. at 1046. 
 79 Id.  
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The court’s hypothetical serves to muddy the waters considerably. It ap-
pears to add a belief component—not simply mens rea, or intent to engage in a 
forbidden act—to the concept of harboring.  Thus, if a relative provides a 
place for a loved one to stay because of a concern that he may be deported, he could 
be illegally harboring, while indifference to the plight of the loved one could 
render the same conduct, with the same intent to provide housing for an 
undocumented individual, legal.  Moreover, it calls into question the rela-
tionship between the employer and employee.  Presumably, if the employer 
offered a job and housing not knowing that an employee was in the country 
illegally, it would not be harboring that employee.  But what if the employer 
in the court’s hypothetical could show it would have offered the job to the 
employees whether or not they were in the country illegally?  Then would 
the offer of housing be harboring?  
The precise boundaries around the prohibition on “encouraging” an un-
documented individual to stay in the United States are similarly unclear.  In 
United States v. Oloyede,80 the Fourth Circuit appears to interpret the term 
broadly, as it states that encouraging does not require “bringing in, trans-
porting, or concealing” but rather “relates to actions taken to convince the 
illegal alien to come to this country or to stay in this country.”81  Yet the facts 
of the case were particularly egregious: the defendants were attorneys who 
offered to assist individuals who were in the country illegally, charging them 
a fee to assist in the process of obtaining legal status by falsifying documents 
to be filed with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) and ly-
ing in INS hearings.82   United States v. Avila-Dominguez83 is similarly unhelpful, 
as the defendant in that case met the undocumented individuals in Mexico, 
assisted in arranging their transportation to an illegal border crossing point, 
“told them he would signal from the other side when it was safe to cross, 
scouted the vicinity for law enforcement officers, then called, whistled and 
waved” when it was safe for crossing.84  He also provided additional support 
after they crossed the border for a fee.85  Taken together, this behavior would 
constitute encouragement under almost any definition.  
	
 80 United States v. Oloyede, 982 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1992).  
 81 Id. at 137.  
 82  Id. at 135.  
 83 United States v. Avila-Dominguez, 610 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1980).  
 84 Id. at 1272. 
 85 Id. 
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B.  Employer Reporting Obligations  
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”)86 compels employ-
ers to verify that their employees have the legal right to work in the United 
States through a specific verification process.  Employers perform this verifi-
cation by completing a Form I-9 and following certain recordkeeping re-
quirements established by the INA.87  They must examine documents pro-
vided by the potential new hire and attest that the documentation provides 
evidence of both that person’s identity and employment authorization.88  
There is a specific list of documents that may serve to prove identify, author-
ization, or both.89  Under penalty of perjury, the employer must attest that it 
has verified these documents on part of the I-9 form.90  Employers must keep 
the I-9 forms for at least three years from the date of hire or one year after 
the date the employment ceases, whichever is later.91  
ICE has the power to conduct audits and inspections to ensure that em-
ployers have complied with the I-9 rules.92  It begins the inspection process 
by serving of a Notice of Inspection (“NOI”) upon an employer.93   The em-
ployer then has three business days from the NOI to produce Forms I-9 and 
other supporting documents, such as payroll information, a list of current 
employees, Articles of Incorporation, and business licenses.94  
E-Verify, as its name suggests, is an additional online verification system 
that compares information employees submit in connection with the I-9 form 
with information maintained by the Social Security Administration and De-
partment of Homeland Security.95  Some employers use E-Verify as an ad-
ditional verification measure, either because they are required to by state law 
or because they choose to do so.96  These employers sign a contract allowing 
	
 86 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3445 (2012).   
 87 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., HANDBOOK FOR EMPLOYERS M-274, 1.0 WHY EMPLOYERS MUST 
VERIFY EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION AND IDENTITY OF NEW EMPLOYEES, 
https://www.uscis.gov/i-9-central/10-why-employers-must-verify-employment-authorization-
and-identity-new-employees (last visited July 20, 2017). 
 88 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(B) (2012). 
 89 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b) (2016). 
 90 Id. § 274a.2(a)(3). 
 91 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(3)(B) (2012); U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FORM I-9 INSPECTION 
OVERVIEW (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/i9-inspection. 
 92 U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FORM I-9 INSPECTION OVERVIEW (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://www.ice.-gov/factsheets/i9-inspection.  
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., WHAT IS E-VERIFY?, https://www.uscis.gov/e-ver-
ify/what-e-verify (last visited May 21, 2017). 
 96 E-Verify is mandatory for all or most employers in Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
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the E-Verify Monitoring and Compliance Unit to conduct desk reviews and 
site visits.97   The Monitoring and Compliance Unit tries to detect and deter 
employer misuse of E-Verify, and has “the authority to share information 
with other government agencies.”98 
If an employer is found to have knowingly hired or continued to employ 
unauthorized workers after learning that such workers are not authorized to 
work in the United States, the employer may face civil fines ranging from 
$250 to $10,000.99  It may also be prevented from participating in future 
federal contracts and receiving other government benefits.100  In some cir-
cumstances, the employer also may be subject to criminal prosecution and 
related criminal penalties.101  These penalties can include fines, imprison-
ment, and in cases of bringing in and harboring aliens, seizure of their vehi-
cles or property used to commit the crime.102  There is, however, a good faith 
defense.103  A worker who shows his/her employer verification documents 
that the employee knows to be false does not necessarily put the employer in 
violation of the law if the employer can establish a good faith belief in the 
employee’s sincerity.104 
For undocumented employees working for a corrupt employer, the em-
ployment verification system can create a dangerous situation in which the 
employer can threaten to challenge the employee’s immigration status if he 
reports the employer for illegal or dangerous working conditions.  In one 
recent example, a construction company is suspected to have alerted ICE to 
the unauthorized status of one of its employees just after that employee re-
quested workers’ compensation for a serious injury he suffered on the job.105  
The employee, who had been living in the United States for seven years with 
his wife and five children, three of whom were born in the United States, was 
	
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah.  See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
E-VERIFY OVERVIEW 1, 7, https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/-Verification/E-
Verify/E-Verify_Native_Documents/e-verify-presentation.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).  
 97 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., E-VERIFY: MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE, 
https://www.uscis.-gov/e-verify/employers/monitoring-and-compliance (last visited May 21, 2017). 
 98 Rachel Perez, Up Against the Wall: New Immigration Measures Impact Employers, AKERMAN (Mar. 2, 
2017), http://www.akerman.com/documents/res.asp?id=2787.  
 99 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(i)–(iii) (2012). 
 100 U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FORM I-9 INSPECTION OVERVIEW (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://www.ice.-gov/factsheets/i9-inspection. 
 101 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 102 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(f), 1324(a)(1)(B)(i)–(iv), 1324(b)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 103 8 C.F.R. § 274a.4 (2016).  
 104 Id. 
 105 Shannon Dooling, An ICE Arrest After a Workers’ Comp Meeting Has Lawyers Questioning if It Was Retaliation, 
WBUR NEWS (May 17, 2017), http://www.wbur.org/news/2017/05/17/ice-arrest-workers-comp. 
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immediately arrested and held for possible deportation.106   
III.  IS THERE A CORPORATE RIGHT TO OFFER SANCTUARY?  
Prior to the passage of RFRA and Hobby Lobby decision, any religious 
exemption from immigration laws would have been based on the First 
Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause.107  Although, as we will discuss, 
Hobby Lobby changed the landscape of religious freedom cases generally,108 
the significant history of immigration and sanctuary cases may nonetheless 
be relevant to an analysis of a possible corporate sanctuary case.  Existing 
case law is likely to provide the basis for determining the government’s inter-
est in the administration of immigration laws. Moreover, because the precise 
application and scope of the Hobby Lobby/RFRA doctrine has yet to be de-
termined, lower courts may look to existing free exercise cases to answer 
questions of first impression.  
In this Part, we consider first existing jurisprudence under the First 
Amendment, particularly cases addressing immigration and sanctuary, and 
ask how a corporate sanctuary claim would be decided under this precedent.  
Then we turn to RFRA, Hobby Lobby, and the potential application of the 
new corporate religious freedom doctrine to a sanctuary case.  
A.  Free Exercise of Religion and Sanctuary  
The First Amendment to the Constitution provides that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”109  As with most 
constitutional doctrines, the Court’s interpretation of this clause has evolved 
and meandered over the decades, and even on a case-by-case basis.110  In the 
	
 106 Id.  Immigration attorneys suggest that this is a change from previous administrations.  “Before, I 
wouldn’t have really had a concern telling someone, ‘Yes, you should go ahead to report something 
like this [worker’s compensation claim] and assert your rights,’” a lawyer reported.  “But now we 
have this added fear that, could an employer in this kind of case just, you know, use someone’s 
immigration situation against them?” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 107 See infra Part III.A.  
 108 See infra Part III.B.  
 109 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 110 See, e.g., Mark W. Cordes, The First Amendment and Religion After Hosanna-Tabor, 41 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 299, 299–314 (2014) (detailing history of free exercise and establishment cases with 
an emphasis on the shifting principle of neutrality); Mark Strasser, Narrow Tailoring, Compelling Inter-
ests, and Free Exercise: On ACA, RFRA and Predictability, 53 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 467, 468–90 (2016) 
(summarizing Free Exercise jurisprudence prior to Hobby Lobby decision); Victoria J. Avalon, The 
Lazarus Effect: Could Florida’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act Resurrect Ecclesiastical Sanctuary?, 30 
STETSON L. REV. 663, 678–89 (2000) (reviewing the evolution of Free Exercise jurisprudence and 
applying to Ninth Circuit sanctuary case United States v. Aguilar); see also Julie Manning Magid & 
Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Religious and Associational Freedoms of Business Owners, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
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1960s and 70s, the Court’s jurisprudence solidified around a pair of cases, 
Sherbert v. Verner111 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,112 that applied a strict scrutiny test, 
in which the court would determine if a government action substantially bur-
dened the claimant’s religious freedom, and if so, whether that burden was 
necessary to serve a compelling government interest.113  
Though Sherbert and Yoder accorded significant deference to the religious 
convictions of the claimants,114 two subsequent cases narrowed the scope of 
free exercise protection significantly.  In United States v. Lee,115 the Court found 
that an Amish employer could be required to pay social security taxes even 
though it violated his religion, because of the government’s overriding inter-
est in establishing the social security system and the likelihood that establish-
ing an exception in the Social Security context could later be applied to in-
come taxes:116  
The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to chal-
lenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that vio-
lates their religious belief. . . . Because the broad public interest in maintain-
ing a sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with 
the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax.117 
In an even more divisive case, Employment Division v. Smith,118 the Court 
distinguished Sherbert and rejected the compelling interest standard com-
pletely.  In a decisive opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote, “To make an 
	
EMP. L. 191, 204–07 (2005) (providing concise history of free exercise test prior to Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith and describing hybrid claims that survive Smith). 
 111 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 112 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 113 The Court in Burwell  v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. refers to this as a “balancing test.”  134 S. Ct. 2751, 
2760 (2014).  Marci Hamilton argues that Yoder was the outlier in free exercise jurisprudence, and 
that “[r]outinely, the Court had declined to pick up strict scrutiny.”  Marci A. Hamilton, The Case 
for Evidence-Based Free Exercise Accommodation: Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Bad Public Policy, 
9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 135 (2015). 
 114 In Sherbert, the claimant was a Seventh-day Adventist who was fired for not working on a Saturday, 
which would have required her to violate her religious convictions.  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398, 399 (1963).  She subsequently was denied unemployment benefits because she had been ter-
minated from her previous position.  Id. at 400–01.  The Court concluded that this denial of benefits 
represented an unlawful burden on her religious beliefs, and that the state had not offered a com-
pelling interest to justify the burden.  Id. at 403–04, 406–07.  In Yoder, the claimants were Amish 
parents who argued that sending their children to public school after eighth grade would violate 
their religious beliefs.  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).  Though acknowledging the 
State’s substantial interest in education, the Court found that imposing the state compulsory edu-
cation law would “gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents’ religious beliefs.”  
Id. at 219.  
 115 455 U.S. 252 (1982).  
 116 Id. at 258–60. 
 117 Id. at 260.  
 118 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
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individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law’s coinci-
dence with his religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest is ‘compel-
ling’ . . . contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.”119  In-
stead, the Smith decision held that the rational basis test, rather than any form 
of heightened scrutiny, would be applied in the case of a neutral, generally 
applicable law.120  This decision provoked significant controversy, and ulti-
mately led to the passage of RFRA.121  
Prior to Smith, a handful of federal decisions, arising out of the sanctuary 
movement of the 1980s, applied the compelling interest test and the princi-
ples of Sherbert and Yoder to individuals expressing a religious commitment to 
providing sanctuary or assistance to undocumented individuals.  In United 
States v. Elder,122 John Elder operated a shelter intended to provide “sanctu-
ary”—in a physical and biblical sense—to individuals fleeing violence and 
unrest in Central America.123  After providing a place for three undocu-
mented individuals to stay, Elder transported them to a bus station.124  He 
was subsequently arrested for unlawful transportation under INA.125  Ac-
cepting his claim that he had provided transportation out of his sincere reli-
gious beliefs, the court concluded without difficulty that the government had 
demonstrated a compelling interest in protecting “a congressionally-sanc-
tioned immigration and naturalization system designed to maintain the in-
tegrity of this Nation’s borders.”126  The court went on to hold that the re-
striction was the least burdensome method that could be used to meet the 
government’s objective, stating, “[T]he Government must retain the sole au-
thority to determine who may cross the borders or travel further within the 
country.  If the Government attempted to accommodate into its immigration 
policy Elder’s religious beliefs, the Government’s efforts would result in no 
immigration policy at all.”127 
The Fifth Circuit upheld this decision and a similar case in United States v. 
	
 119 Id. at 885.  
 120 Id..; Cordes, supra note 110, at 313–14. 
 121 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Uncon-
stitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 439–40 (1994) (describing the passage and goal of the RFRA); see 
also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997) (noting the RFRA was passed in “direct 
response” to Smith).  A stated purpose of the RFRA was “to restore the compelling interest test as 
set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its application in all cases where 
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012) (citing Sherbert 
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). 
 122 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985). 
 123 Id. at 1576. 
 124 Id.  
 125 Id.  
 126 Id. at 1578.  
 127 Id. at 1579.  
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Merkt.128  Though Elder applied Yoder, in Merkt the Fifth Circuit questioned 
whether a compelling interest balancing test should be applied to a case in-
volving “public safety, peace, and order.”129  Though the court appeared 
willing to reject this standard in the public safety context, it ultimately con-
cluded it would apply Yoder out of an abundance of caution.130  
The Merkt court, which made no bones about its lack of sympathy for the 
accused, was clearly bothered by the argument that a religious objection such 
as the one presented could offer a challenge to a criminal statute.  In a 
strongly worded opinion, the Court found “the interest in uniform applica-
tion of a facially neutral criminal law is acute.”131  It also called into question 
whether enforcement of immigration laws actually “unduly burden[ed]” the 
free exercise of religion of the appellants, Elder and Stacey Lynn Merkt, sug-
gesting that they could have found other, legal means to support undocu-
mented individuals.132  Then, in a stinging rejection of the defense, which 
could well be brought up in future sanctuary cases, the court concluded:  
Appellants’ ‘do it yourself’ immigration policy, even if grounded in 
sincerely held religious conviction, is irreconcilably, voluntarily, 
and knowingly at war with the duly legislated border control policy.  
In this case, the claims of conscience must yield to the twin imper-
atives of evenhanded enforcement of criminal laws and preserva-
tion of our national identity as defined by the immigration laws.133 
The reasoning in Merkt was applied and extended by the Ninth Circuit in 
United States v. Aguilar,134 a case involving a number of individuals convicted 
of smuggling undocumented people into the United States.135  Dismissing the 
notion that evidence was even necessary to prove the government’s interest, 
the described the right to maintain border security and exclude individuals 
as a “fundamental sovereign attribute.”136  The court also rejected the argu-
ment that it should consider crafting a limited exception for the religious be-
liefs of the convicted individuals, suggesting that such an exception would 
	
 128 794 F.2d 950, 953 (5th Cir. 1986) (consolidating Elder’s case with that of a volunteer from his 
sanctuary, Stacey Lynn Merkt). 
 129 Id. at 955.  
 130  Id.  
 131 Id. at 956. 
 132 Id.  The Court suggested that Elder and Merkt, by taking it upon themselves to proactively provide 
sanctuary and transportation, rather than legal means such as making donations or helping to file 
legal petitions, were “voluntarily” assuming the burden on their religion, and it was not imposed 
on them by the government.  Id.  
 133 United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 957 (5th Cir. 1986).  
 134 United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989).  
 135 Id. at 666 (“Appellants were convicted of masterminding and running a modern-day underground 
railroad that smuggled Central American natives across the Mexican border with Arizona.”). 
 136 Id. at 695 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 
345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)).  
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seriously undermine immigration policy, due to the plethora of similarly-sit-
uated religious groups and individuals.137  
Finally, in a footnote that foreshadowed the Hobby Lobby decision, the 
Ninth Circuit speculated that the appellants likely wished the court would 
view their case as limited to just them as individuals, not as part of a much 
larger religious group.138  This, the court stated, was unreasonable: “Courts 
cannot possibly grant an exemption to certain members of a group while 
denying it to others of the same group.”139  In fact, RFRA would require 
future courts to consider the compelling state interest and least restrictive 
means tests as applied to the individual.140  
Though these are just a few decisions applying the Yoder compelling inter-
est framework to a sanctuary claim, they are by no means equivocal in their 
opinions.  Applying Smith’s weaker rational basis test would render free exer-
cise claims in the sanctuary context all but fruitless.  This alone should make 
any individual or corporation pause before offering sanctuary.  When com-
bined with broad definitions of harboring, one could see a tough challenge for 
corporations that offered employees nothing more than a place to stay, even 
if it did not conceal them from authorities, or provided undocumented indi-
viduals with transportation, even if it made no attempt to evade immigration 
authorities.  The question then becomes how such a sanctuary case would be 
decided after Hobby Lobby, and whether the broad deference granted to reli-
gious claimants under RFRA changes the existing sanctuary landscape.  
B.  Hobby Lobby, RFRA, and the Corporate Right to Religious Freedom  
As noted above, in Smith, the Supreme Court held that a person’s reli-
gious beliefs do not exempt her from neutral laws of general applicability.141  
Such laws do not have to withstand the strict scrutiny standard because, Smith 
held, that requirement would create “a private right to ignore generally ap-
plicable laws.”142  In so holding, the Supreme Court dramatically narrowed 
the circumstances under which a person might claim exemption from a law 
based on the right of free exercise guaranteed by the First Amendment. 
In the wake of Smith, Congress passed RFRA in 1993.143  RFRA prohibits 
	
 137 Id. at 696 (quoting United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1579 (S.D. Tex. 1985)). 
 138 Id. at 696 n.33. 
 139 Id.  
 140 See infra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.  
 141 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990). 
 142 Id. at 886. 
 143 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4); see also supra notes 17, 120–21 and accompanying text. 
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the government from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of reli-
gion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless the 
Government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”144  
RFRA requires the individual application of the least restrictive means test to 
the claimant.145  This means the government cannot argue that uniformity 
in the application of federal statutes, in and of itself, is sufficient to override 
a claimant’s interest in the free exercise of religion.146  Rather, courts must 
engage in a case-by-case inquiry that goes beyond that which might have been 
required under the First Amendment.147  
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(“RLUIPA”),148 amended RFRA’s definition of “free exercise of religion” to 
include “any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by, or central to, 
a system of religious belief.”149  This was to be “construed in favor of a broad 
protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the 
terms of this chapter and the Constitution.”150  Importantly, this definition 
omitted any reference to the First Amendment, effecting a separation from 
First Amendment case law that Justice Alito later noted in his majority opin-
ion in Hobby Lobby.151 
The Hobby Lobby case was brought by David Green and his family, which 
own the Hobby Lobby chain of arts and crafts stores and Mardel, a Christian 
bookstore chain.  Their case was consolidated with another case brought by 
	
 144 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (2012). 
 145 Id. § 2000bb-1(b)(2). 
 146 The Supreme Court first applied this principle in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal, where it noted:  
RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied 
through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular claimant whose 
sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened. . . . Under the more focused 
inquiry required by RFRA and the compelling interest test, the Government’s mere invo-
cation of the general characteristics of Schedule I substances, as set forth in the Controlled 
Substances Act, cannot carry the day.   
  546 U.S. 418, 430–32 (2006). 
 147 Id. at 439 (“We have no cause to pretend that the task assigned by Congress to the courts under 
RFRA is an easy one.  Indeed, the very sort of difficulties highlighted by the Government here were 
cited by this Court in deciding that the approach later mandated by Congress under RFRA was 
not required as a matter of constitutional law under the Free Exercise Clause.”).  
 148 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2012).  
 149 Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).  RFRA originally defined exercise of religion as “the exercise of religion under 
the First Amendment.”  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-24 (1994 ed.)).  
 150 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2012). 
 151 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762, 2773. 
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the Mennonite Hahn family, owners of the Conestoga Wood Specialties fur-
niture company.152  The Green and Hahn families believe that life begins at 
the time of conception.153  They objected to providing the four forms of birth 
control mandated by the Affordable Care Act’s (“ACA”)154 coverage guide-
lines that they believed to be abortifacients.155  The Hahn and Green families 
argued that the ACA mandate should not apply to them because of both 
RFRA and their free exercise rights under the First Amendment.  Because 
the Court ruled that the mandate was unlawful under RFRA, it did not reach 
their First Amendment claims.156 
In its application of RFRA’s mandate that any government action impos-
ing a substantial burden on religious exercise must serve a compelling interest 
and be the least restrictive means of satisfying that interest,157 Justice Alito 
emphasized the “very broad protection for religious liberty” that RFRA was 
designed to provide.158  Importantly for our discussion of sanctuary corpora-
tions, the Court refused to engage in a determination of whether the Hahn 
and Green families’ religious beliefs were “mistaken or insubstantial.”159  In 
so doing, the Court affirmed that parties need only establish that their reli-
gious beliefs are sincere, something the Department of Health and Human 
Services (“HHS”) had not challenged in the Hobby Lobby case.160 
The Court assumed, without extensive discussion, that the mandate to 
provide contraceptive coverage served a compelling government interest.161  
Based on previous sanctuary cases, we imagine it would draw a similar con-
clusion in the case of federal immigration laws.162  It did not find, however, 
that the mandate was the least restrictive means of serving that interest.163  
Noting that HHS had created an alternative system for religious nonprofits 
with religious objections to the contraceptive mandate, the Court concluded 
that this alternative system “achieves all of the Government’s aims while 
	
 152 Id. at 2764–65. 
 153 Id. at 2764, 2766. 
 154 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–18121 (2012). 
 155 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759, 2766.  
 156 Id. at 2785. 
 157 Id. at 2759. 
 158 Id. at 2767. 
 159 Id. at 2779. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 2780.  Richard Epstein argues that this assumption was flawed, and that Sherbert and Yoder set 
forth a “narrower conception of compelling state interest.”  Richard A. Epstein, The Defeat of the 
Contraceptive Mandate in Hobby Lobby: Right Results, Wrong Reasons, 2013–14 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
35, 51.  
 162 See supra notes 126, 131, 136 and accompanying text (pointing out precedent dealing with sanctuary 
cases and immigration).  
 163 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.  
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providing greater respect for religious liberty.”164  Because the contraceptive 
mandate was not the least restrictive means of serving the government’s com-
pelling interest, RFRA excused the respondents from compliance.165   
In sum, the Hobby Lobby case established a relatively broad approach to 
three of the four elements of RFRA: (1) the substantial burden by a federal 
law on (2) the exercise of religion unless (3) the burden serves a compelling 
interest.  With regard to the fourth element, that the law at issue be the least 
restrictive means of serving the compelling government interest, the Court 
took pains to suggest that its analysis was limited to the case at hand.166  It 
framed the “least restrictive” analysis by comparing the provision of health 
care to the tax system.  Recalling the Lee case, where the Court denied a free 
exercise challenge to the obligation to pay social security taxes, the Court 
noted, “the fundamental point would be that there simply is no less restrictive 
alternative to the categorical requirement to pay taxes.”167  Allowing people 
to assert religious objections to paying any portion of their taxes “would lead 
to chaos.”168  It also noted that there could be no alternative prohibitions on 
racial discrimination, which it noted were “precisely tailored to achieve that 
critical goal.”169  
This aspect of the decision—both the attempt at limiting the holding and 
the lack of a substantive basis by which to do so—engendered significant crit-
icism.170  As a number of scholars have pointed out, the dicta regarding racial 
	
 164 Id. at 2759. 
 165 Id. at 2759–60. 
 166 Id. at 2760.  
 167 Id. at 2784.  
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 2783. 
 170 See, e.g., Suneal Bedi, Fully and Barely Clothed: Case Studies in Gender and Religious Employment Discrimination 
in the Wake of Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, 12 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 133, 134 (2016) (arguing 
that corporations may now be designated “expressive associations,” which would allow them to 
discriminate against employees who might frustrate the corporation’s speech); Leslie C. Griffin, 
Hobby Lobby: The Crafty Case that Threatens Women’s Rights and Religious Freedom, 42 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 641, 687 (2015) (“With Hobby Lobby’s religion-friendly standard, all federal laws are 
now subject to challenge, with the possibility off every citizen becoming ‘a law unto himself’ until 
the rule of law is undermined.” (quoting Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
885 (1990))).  Some have argued that Hobby Lobby’s full impact could be mitigated by a narrower 
reading but recognize the potential breadth of the holding.  See, e.g., Alex J. Luchenitser, A New Era 
of Inequality? Hobby Lobby and Religious Exemptions from Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 63, 64 (2015) (arguing generally that anti-discrimination claims will survive Hobby Lobby and 
RFRA, but that they are likely to see more significantly more challenges, and that it is difficult to 
predict how the Supreme Court will rule); Vincent J. Samar, The Potential Impact of Hobby Lobby on 
LGBT Civil Rights, 16 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 547, 590–91 (2015) (suggesting that Hobby Lobby could 
threaten LGBT rights “if Justice Alito’s majority position is taken for all that its logic implies,” but 
a more narrow reading could preserve those rights). 
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discrimination provided no authority or basis for such a broad claim.171  Fur-
thermore, the express individual mandate of RFRA would require the Court 
to decide such claims on an individual basis.172  Finally, although it was not 
the basis for finding the least restrictive means test had not been met, Justice 
Alito suggested that the government could simply have provided (and paid 
for) contraceptive coverage for women.173  This suggestion engendered signif-
icant controversy for tipping future cases on the side of the plaintiff, as an 
employer could always simply argue that the “least restrictive means” of car-
rying out a government policy would be for the government to pay for it.174 
C.  Using Hobby Lobby and RFRA to Provide Immigrant Sanctuary  
As noted in Part III.A, significant precedent rejects the application of the 
Free Exercise Clause to individuals seeking to offer sanctuary to undocu-
mented individuals, even when they are motivated by sincere religious be-
liefs.  However, Hobby Lobby arguably broadened and extended the scope of 
protection offered to individuals and corporations through the application of 
RFRA.  Could RFRA, as interpreted in Hobby Lobby, resurrect sanctuary 
claims?  Could it be used to justify a corporate practice of providing sanctuary 
for immigrants, if doing so is part of the corporation’s religious beliefs?  This 
Part explores the application of a RFRA-based argument in the context of a 
corporation’s religious sanctuary claim. 
1.  Corporate Sanctuary Could Take Several Forms 
Given the increased enforcement of immigration laws and the contem-
poraneous growth of the sanctuary movement since the 2016 election, some 
employers may want to offer sanctuary through their business operations.  In 
this Part we describe a series of hypothetical situations that could arise in 
corporations and create a conflict between the religious convictions ex-
pressed by the owner(s) of a corporation, and federal immigration laws.  
	
 171 See, e.g., Strasser, supra note 110, at 505–06 (noting the Court was not “especially persuasive when 
explaining why the decision would not lead to more discrimination” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); Hanna Martin, Note, Race, Religion, and RFRA: The Implications of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc. in Employment Discrimination, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 1, 30–35 (arguing dicta 
in Hobby Lobby is insufficient to prevent racial discrimination by employers).   
 172 See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text (explaining that RFRA requires the least restrictive 
means test be applied on an individual basis and the implications of that requirement). 
 173 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780. 
 174 See Griffin, supra note 170, at 676 (identifying possible snowball effects of suggesting the government 
provide everything that can be considered offensive).  
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a.  Sanctuary Taxis 
We begin with the real story of a taxicab company owned by Victor Pi-
zarro in Plattsburgh, NY.  In January 2017, Mr. Pizarro began to receive 
requests from passengers to be taken to a specific road near the border be-
tween the U.S. and Canada.175  Pizarro notified U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection agents when he received these requests so that the agents could 
meet the cab and check his passengers’ documentation.  In one instance, 
however, he drove a mother and her fifteen-year-old son to the border after 
they had told him that their papers were in order.  At the border, the mother 
was detained and deported because her visa had expired, and Pizarro was 
told that the son would likely be put in foster care.  After that incident, Pi-
zarro changed his practices.  He instructed his drivers to help get passengers 
safely across the border, and to try to ensure that Canadian officials are wait-
ing if the passengers do not have valid visas.  “But as far as ripping families 
apart, we’re not in that business anymore,” he told a reporter.  “It happened 
once, and that’s it.  It won’t happen again with us.”176  
Pizarro’s decision to help passengers safely reach the Canadian border 
was motivated by President Trump’s increased focus on immigrants and 
Muslims.  The administration’s change in policy had a direct effect on this 
part of his business practice.  Other taxicab drivers in the same geographic 
area express similar motivations for helping immigrants cross to Canada out-
side of the U.S. Border Control process.  One driver in the same town who 
had voted for President Trump explained to a journalist that the immigrants 
he was helping “are human beings no matter where they came from . . . . It’s 
not like they’re aliens from another world or something.”177 
If these passengers are illegal immigrants who fear the recently increased 
threat of deportation, then these drivers may very well be violating Section 
1324 of INA, which makes it a crime to “conceal, harbor, or shield from 
detection . . . in any place, including any building or means of transporta-
tion . . . an alien [who] has come to, entered, or remains in the United States 
in violation of law.”178  By using their taxicabs as a “means of transportation” 
to help “conceal, harbor, or shield” the “alien” passengers from detection by 
Border Control, the drivers appear to be doing what Section 1324 prohibits.  
	
175  Ashley Cleek, A Taxi Driver’s Mission to Help Refugees Reach the Canadian Border, NPR (Apr. 12, 2017, 
4:32 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/04/12/522991849/one-taxi-drivers-mission-to-help-refu-
gees-reach-the-canadian-border. 
176  Id. 
177  Melissa Fares, A Trump Supporter, and His Cab, Play Unexpected Role in Escape to Canada, REUTERS (May 
10, 2017, 11:00 AM), http://news.trust.org/item/20170510110750-kzl3q. 
 178 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)–(iv) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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b.  Sanctuary Restaurants 
A second example involves the service industry, which has an unusually 
high percentage of unauthorized workers.179  Russell Street Deli, in Detroit, 
Michigan, found itself at the center of some unwanted attention when an AP 
News article described it as part of the Sanctuary Restaurant Movement in 
January 2017.180  Co-owner Ben Hall has stated that sanctuary restaurants 
do not harbor undocumented immigrants.181  Instead, Russell Street Deli, 
like other sanctuary restaurants, posts signs alerting their customers to the 
fact that they welcome all people as customers and workers regardless of their 
national origin.182  
Hypothetically, however, we can imagine what might happen if a restau-
rant chooses not to verify the employment authorization of its workers.  Since 
so many unauthorized immigrants work in the service industry, and there is 
such high turnover in the hospitality field (71.2% in 2015, compared with 
45.9% in the private sector), it is logical to conclude that some restaurants 
fail to verify work authorization consistently.183  Our hypothetical restaurant 
most likely hires lower-wage hourly employees.  In reviewing the documen-
tation required by the I-9 form, it may rely on the word of the employee 
without doing extensive verification or using the E-Verify system, which is 
only mandatory in a few states.184  Michigan is not one of them.  As a result, 
the restaurant may have some undocumented workers on its staff without 
knowingly falsifying any documents or recruiting illegal employees.   
A sanctuary restaurant that does not complete the I-9 verification process 
as required faces the threat of civil penalties.185  The civil penalties for know-
ingly hiring or knowingly continuing to employ an unauthorized worker 
range from more than $500 for a first offense to more than $20,000 for a 
	
 179 According to a November 2016 report, in 2014, 32% of unauthorized immigrants worked in the 
service industry compared with 17% of U.S.-born workers.  Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Oc-
cupations of Unauthorized Immigrant Workers, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.pewhis-
panic.org/2016/11/03/occupations-of-unauthorized-immigrant-workers/. 
 180 Sophia Tareen, Restaurants: The Next Front for the Immigration Debate?, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 25, 
2017), https://apnews.com/14f3e37bf9fc45c4a8b79bca3cc6d2fe. 
 181 Dave Spencer, ‘Sanctuary Restaurants’ Join Immigration Debate in Detroit, Ann Arbor, FOX 2 (Jan. 25, 2017, 
7:01 PM), http://www.fox2detroit.com/news/local-news-/sanctuary-restaurants-join-immigra-
tion-debate-in-detroit-ann-arbor. 
 182 Brenna Houck, Sanctuary Restaurants Are Redefining the Meaning of Hospitality, EATER (Mar. 22, 2017, 
4:02 PM), https://www.eater.com/2017/3/22/15026904/sanctuary-restaurant. 
 183 Talia Ralph, How Restaurants Hire Undocumented Workers, EATER (Feb. 28, 2017, 10:17 AM), 
https://www.eater.com/2017/2/28/14749392/undocumented-workers-restaurant-illegal. 
 184 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 96, at 7. 
 185 Penalties, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. https://www.uscis.gov/i-9-central/penalties (last 
visited May 21, 2017). 
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third or subsequent offense.  Criminal penalties may also attach.  Sanctions 
for “engaging in a pattern or practice of hiring” unauthorized workers in-
clude fines of up to $3,000 per worker and up to six months of prison time.186  
The potential price of flawed I-9 paperwork, in particular, has increased 
dramatically.  In August 2016, the Department of Justice announced an in-
crease in all penalties associated with I-9 compliance.187  The penalty for er-
rors in paperwork increased ninety-six percent, with the maximum penalty 
per individual jumping from $1,100 to $2,156.188  With the potential cost of 
noncompliance soaring, employers may pay closer attention to the way in 
which they complete the I-9 process.  Alternatively, they may find it increas-
ingly worthwhile to seek a religious exemption from such compliance 
through RFRA. 
In a RFRA-based exemption claim, a sanctuary restaurant could assert 
that it is offering sanctuary in the form of paid work to unauthorized workers, 
thereby allowing those workers to afford food and shelter.  It could assert fur-
ther that in doing so, it is providing sanctuary as part of its exercise of religion.  
c.  Sanctuary Software Companies 
Technology companies have been among the most vocal opponents of 
the Trump Administration’s executive orders restricting immigration and 
travel from several predominantly Muslim countries.  In response to the Jan-
uary 2017 Executive Order, dozens of companies including Microsoft, Face-
book, LinkedIn, Apple, and Uber expressed their opposition in various 
forms.189  After the Trump Administration issued a second executive order 
limiting travel and immigration in March 2017, 162 technology companies 
signed an amicus brief in support of a legal challenge to that order.190  
A company may be affected by these executive orders in several ways.  It 
may, for example, have employees who hold visas allowing them to work in 
the United States, but whose family members are not similarly authorized to 
	
 186 Id. 
 187 Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,987, 42,991 (July 1, 2016). 
 188 Id.; Gregory A. Wald, Civil Penalties Nearly Double for Form I-9 Violations and Significantly Increase for Other 
Immigration-Related Violations, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.natlawreview.com/arti-
cle/civil-penalties-nearly-double-form-i-9-violations-and-significantly-increase-other. 
 189 Frederic Lardinois, Kate Conger, Matthew Lynley & Darrell Etherington, Tech Reacts to Trump’s 
Immigration Ban, TECH CRUNCH (Jan. 28, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/-28/tech-com-
panies-react-to-immigration-ban. 
 190 See generally Brief of Technology Companies as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, Int’l Refugee 
Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 17-1351 (4th Cir. Apr. 19, 2017). 
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work.  For example, Murtadha Al-Tameemi is an Iraq-born software engi-
neer working in Facebook’s Seattle office.191  His family fled the violence in 
Iraq and was resettled in Vancouver, three hours away, by a church group.192  
Al-Tameemi visited his mother and younger brother there regularly before 
the first Executive Order issued.193  Afterward, however, he feared that if he 
traveled to Canada, he would not be let back into the United States.194    
Immigrant employees may be affected in other ways as well.  Imagine an 
Iraqi software engineer who has a visa, but whose husband and seventeen-
year-old son do not.  Enforcement of the executive orders targeting Iraqi and 
certain other immigrants would make it increasingly difficult for her family 
to sustain itself, and for her son to get an education, in the United States.  
This, in turn, could profoundly affect her and other such employees’ willing-
ness to work for the company.   
In light of these potential impacts, a hypothetical software company could 
adopt a religious interest in providing sanctuary to immigrant employees.  If 
ICE requested information about an engineer’s address and family, for ex-
ample, the software company might choose not to comply with that request.  
It may decide instead that it is more important to shelter employees and their 
families from detection by ICE than to comply with the letter of Section 
1324, which makes it a crime to “harbor, or shield from detection . . . in any 
place” any “alien [who] has come to, entered, or remains in the United States 
in violation of law.”195  A court might easily conclude that the company’s 
refusal to provide information pertaining to a potential immigration violation 
is exactly that kind of “harboring” that Section 1324 prohibits.   
2.  Using RFRA to Secure Corporate Sanctuary for Immigrants 
As noted in Part III.A., based on existing case law, it appears highly un-
likely that a plaintiff corporation could succeed on a First Amendment reli-
gious sanctuary argument.  Alternatively, in order to succeed on a RFRA 
claim, a party must show that a federal law “substantially burden[s]” the 
party’s “exercise of religion.”196  The government, in order to defeat the 
claim, must show that the law in question “is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest” and “is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
	
 191 Hannah Allam, How Trump’s Immigration Order Affects One Iraqi Family, MCCLATCHY: DC BUREAU 
(Jan. 27, 2017, 6:05PM), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-goverment/-white-
house/article129235889.html. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id.  
 195 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)–(iv) (2012). 
 196 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012). 
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compelling governmental interest.”197   
A corporation wishing to provide sanctuary to immigrants, therefore, 
needs to establish both that (1) the immigration law substantially burdens its 
provision of sanctuary and (2) the provision of sanctuary is part of its exercise 
of religion.  As discussed below, neither of these will be especially difficult to 
prove.  The more challenging aspect of the RFRA claim concerns strict scru-
tiny of the immigration law itself.  The corporation must prove either that 
the immigration law at issue does not further a compelling interest or that 
the law is not the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.  We ad-
dress the likely merits of each potential argument below. 
a.  Providing Sanctuary May Be Framed as an Exercise of Religion 
Whether a corporation provides sanctuary for religious or secular reasons 
is an important threshold question.  Many employers may wish to provide 
sanctuary in one form or another for their employees, customers, or associ-
ates in some way without invoking any religious motivation at all.  The Sanc-
tuary Restaurant movement, for example, discloses no religious affiliation on 
its website.198  We do not here take on the question of whether secularly-
based moral convictions regarding sanctuary would be considered “reli-
gious” under RFRA.199  However, employers that have a genuine and sin-
cerely-held religious belief may assert a religious motivation for providing 
sanctuary relatively easily.  As described in Part I.A and I.B. above, the pro-
vision of sanctuary is well established as a religious practice in many faiths; it 
has also been recognized in previous sanctuary cases.200  
	
 197 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). 
 198 See SANCTUARY RESTAURANTS, http://sanctuaryrestaurants.org (last visited July 20, 2017). 
 199 The definition of religion under the First Amendment is by no means settled, and while certainly 
relevant to the notion of a sanctuary corporation, is beyond the scope of this Article.  See Dmitry N. 
Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest Proposal, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 309, 385 (1994) (offering a 
new definition of religion for First Amendment purposes); see also Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: 
A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 233 (1989) (noting that “few areas 
of constitutional law lie in greater confusion” than the definition of religion).  See generally Nelson 
Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2011) (discussing how courts should treat religious claims 
by nonbelievers).  However, it is important to note that the question of whether a deeply held moral 
conviction can be the basis for a religious claim under the First Amendment is ripe for review.  In 
March for Life v. Burwell, the D.D.C. recently held that a non-religious organization should be allowed 
the same exception from the contraceptive coverage provision of the ACA as a religious organiza-
tion, based on an equal protection argument under the Fifth Amendment.  See 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 
128 (D.D.C. 2015) (“If the purpose of the religious employer exemption is . . . to respect the anti-
abortifacient tenets of an employment relationship, then it makes no rational sense—indeed, no 
sense whatsoever—to deny March [for] Life that same respect.  By singling out a specific trait for 
accommodation, and then excising from its protection an organization with that precise trait, it 
sweeps in arbitrary and irrational strokes that simply cannot be countenanced . . . .”).  
 200 See, e.g., United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 956 (5th Cir. 1986) (“The sincerity of appellants’ 
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In order to claim a religious basis for providing sanctuary, the case law 
suggests that an employer needs to do relatively little beyond stating one.  In 
Hobby Lobby, for example, the Court appeared to be satisfied with the Hahns’ 
“Vision and Values Statements” and its “board-adopted ‘Statement on the 
Sanctity of Human Life’” as evidence of their religious belief.201  The Court 
did not question the sincerity of the Hahns’ statements in these documents, nor 
did it consider any alternative rationale the Hahns may have had for adopting 
religious rhetoric in their corporate documents.  Moreover, the Court made it 
clear that it would not analyze the plausibility of the religious belief articulated 
by the plaintiff, as long as it was sincerely held.202  It would not be burdensome, 
therefore, for a corporation considering a RFRA claim to establish a religious 
motivation for providing sanctuary to immigrants.  It may be as simple a mat-
ter as drafting a statement of religious concern for sanctuary and ensuring that 
the board of directors adopts it, but we do not yet have a roadmap from the 
Court as to what such an adoption might look like.203  
b.  Immigration Laws Substantially Burden This Religious Exercise 
In Hobby Lobby, the fact that the corporation might face a financial penalty 
for the failure to comply with the law constituted a “substantial burden.”204  
	
religious motivation to aid El Salvadorans was not doubted by the trial court.”); United States v. 
Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1578 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (finding “Elder acted in accordance with his per-
sonal view of Christianity,” and noting that “[a]ccording to the Bishop [of the Brownsville Diocese], 
as a practicing Roman Catholic, the expression of Elder’s inner religious thoughts can properly be 
evidenced by charitable social action”).  
 201 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764 (2014). 
 202 Id. at 2777–78.  This refusal to inquire into the plausibility of the claimant’s beliefs runs directly counter 
to—and should overrule—the Merkt court’s suggestion that, despite their sincerely held religious be-
liefs, the appellants were not “required” by their faith to engage in illegal acts, and that the enforcement 
of the law therefore did not clearly represent an undue burden.  See Merkt, 794 F.2d at 956.   
 203 The precise contours of how a sanctuary corporation might express or adopt a religious conviction 
are outside the scope of this Article, but is a matter of significant concern among both constitutional 
and corporate law scholars.  See, e.g., Roni Adil Elias, Transforming the Business Corporation into a Religious 
Association: How Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. Made the Religious Values of Fictional Persons Mean 
More than the Reproductive Rights of Women, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 15–19 (2016) (dis-
cussing the difficulty in both adopting and enforcing a corporation’s commitment to a religious 
principle).  See generally Ronald J. Colombo, Religious Conceptions of Corporate Purpose, 74 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 813 (2017) (arguing generally that corporations invariably have a religious purpose); Lucien 
J. Dhooge, Public Accommodation Statutes and Sexual Orientation: Should There Be a Religious Exemption for 
Secular Businesses?, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 319 (2015) (underscoring the risks of allowing 
more religious exemptions to public accommodation statutes, especially in the context of statutes 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).  The majority opinion in Hobby Lobby 
passed the buck on this issue to state courts and state law to resolve questions of how religious 
convictions could be asserted, and how they might be examined to determine if they are sincere.  
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775.  
 204 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775–76.  
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The argument that INA or IRCA “substantially burden”205 the provision of 
sanctuary appears straightforward in the sanctuary context.  The sanctuary 
taxicabs may argue that their practice of safely transporting unauthorized 
immigrants to the Canadian border is sharply limited by Section 1324, which 
may criminalize the practice.206  The sanctuary restaurants may argue that 
their refusal to verify their applicants’ work authorization status, which they 
may characterize as a religiously-motivated provision of sanctuary, is ren-
dered all but impossible by the assessment of increasing civil and criminal 
penalties.  As businesses with relatively low profit margins, as a general rule, 
such restaurants are especially ill-equipped to bear the financial and penal 
consequences of I-9 rule enforcement.  The same arguments may be made 
by sanctuary software companies seeking to provide sanctuary to employees 
and their families.  
c.  Immigration Laws May Further a Compelling Interest 
RFRA establishes that the government may only substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion if it proves that application of the burden “(1) is 
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least re-
strictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”207  In 
applying RFRA, then, a court should analyze whether the challenged law’s 
burden on religious freedom furthers a compelling governmental interest, 
and if so, whether the regulation in question is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that interest.  
There are at least three sets of immigration laws at issue in the current 
debate over immigration control.  The first set stems from the IRCA and in-
cludes the requirement to verify employment through the I-9 process.208  The 
second is the INA, which makes it a crime to “conceal, harbor, or shield from 
detection . . . in any place, including any building or means of transporta-
tion,” any “alien [who] has come to, entered, or remains in the United States 
in violation of law.”209  A third type of law is the kind of immigration control 
law typified by the executive orders issued in January and March 2017.  These 
limit entry to and from the United States from certain countries and for cer-
tain individuals. 210  While employers cannot enforce or fail to enforce such 
	
 205 For a discussion of Hobby Lobby and the “substantially burden” element of RFRA, see Strasser, supra 
note 110, at 501–505.  
 206 See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.  
 207 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012). 
 208 See supra Part II.B. 
 209 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012). 
 210 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (directing executive department 
and agencies to “employ all lawful means to enforce the immigration laws of the United States”).  
	
May 2018] SANCTUARY CORPORATIONS 1133 
	
laws directly, they are substantially affected by their terms to the extent that 
the employers have hired or are people subject to the immigration control 
laws.  The increasingly restrictive atmosphere exacerbated by these laws may 
limits employers’ ability to attract and retain talented immigrant workers.  
Whether these laws, as applied to our hypothetical sanctuary claimants, 
further a compelling government interest is a challenging legal question.  As 
a historical matter, the Supreme Court has viewed immigration control as 
essential to national security.211  As the Elder court observed: “In discussing 
the importance of United States’ immigration laws, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly emphasized the importance which sovereign nations place upon 
controlling entry through their borders.”212  The Court has deferred to Con-
gress with regard to immigration controls, noting in Fiallo v. Bell that “‘over 
no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete 
than it is over’ the admission of aliens.”213  In a RFRA-based debate over 
corporate sanctuary, presumably, the government would argue that each of 
the immigration laws discussed here further the compelling government in-
terest of protecting our borders from foreign threats. 
Much of the case law in which the Court made these observations, how-
ever, comes from an era predating the development of many of the most 
serious current international threats.  Elder was decided in 1985 and Fiallo 
was decided in 1977, well before the advent of bioterrorism, hacking, or any 
of the other technology-based threats to global security.  Forty years after 
Fiallo, it is reasonable to ask whether the greatest threats to national security 
can still be controlled by immigration law.214  Businesses and governments 
may have more to fear now from cyberthreats, hacking and phishing than 
from unauthorized immigrants, the vast majority of whom pose no actual 
threat to their communities or the United States in general.  Scholars have 
pointed out not only the divergence between recent immigration policies and 
current national security threats, but also the moral and reputational conse-
quences of implementing immigration controls that tend to promote ethnic 
discrimination.215 
	
 211 See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972) (noting that immigration controls are 
“inherent in sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international relations and defending 
the country against foreign encroachments and dangers—a power to be exercised exclusively by 
the political branches of government”). 
 212 United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1578 (S.D. Tex. 1985).   
 213 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 
(1909)). 
 214 See generally Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Is Immigration Law National Security Law?, 66 EMORY L.J. 669 
(2017) (detailing immigration policies motivated by national security concerns and casting doubt 
the efficacy of those policies).  For an argument that immigration law should be used to further 
national security interests but in a restrained manner, see generally L. Rizer III, The Ever-Changing 
Bogeyman: How Fear Has Driven Immigration Law and Policy, 77 LA. L. REV. 243 (2016).  
 215 See, e.g., Wadhia, supra note 214, at 681–82. 
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Despite this potential area of controversy, we believe it is unlikely that a 
court would find that the government does not have a compelling interest in 
national security, border control, and enforcement of immigration laws.  The 
more pertinent question is whether those laws are the least restrictive means 
of achieving those ends.  
d.  Current Immigration Laws May Not Be the Least Restrictive Means 
Even if current immigration laws further a compelling government inter-
est, under RFRA the government bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
enforcement of these statutes are the least restrictive means of doing so as applied 
to the individual or corporation seeking the religious exception.216  There is, 
at a minimum, a legitimate difference of opinion as to whether more recent 
immigration control measures are an effective means of improving national 
security at all.  Some have argued that the anti-terrorism provisions of INA, 
for example, are too broad to effectively protect national security.217  Others 
have argued that the investor visa program is too lax to promote national se-
curity.218  National security might be more effectively addressed through a 
comprehensive reform of cybersecurity measures, others suggest.219 
There is also a questionable link between the recent executive orders on 
immigration and the goals they claim to promote.  In February 2017, Judge 
Leonie M. Brinkema of the Eastern District of Virginia granted the Com-
monwealth of Virginia’s motion for a preliminary injunction against Presi-
	
 216 The rigor of the “least restrictive means” test is still open to debate.  In Hobby Lobby, the majority 
opinion offers a purely theoretical—some might say fantastical—alternative way for the government 
to ensure women receive contraceptive coverage: the government could pay for it.  Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, One Cheer for Hobby Lobby: Improbable Alternatives, Truly Strict Scrutiny, and Third-Party Employee 
Burdens, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 153, 157–59 (2015).  Gedicks describes the test adopted in Hobby 
Lobby to decide RFRA cases as “truly strict scrutiny” on par with the analysis applied in due process 
and equal protection cases.  Id. at 166.  Others have described the test as “super-strict scrutiny,” 
pointing out that there is a significant distinction between “least restrictive means,” (as is required 
under RFRA) and “narrowly tailored” (as is applied in other strict scrutiny cases).  See Hamilton, supra 
note 113, at 134.  Hobby Lobby suggests the burden is on the government to show it lacked any other, 
less restrictive alternatives.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2571, 2780 (2014) (“[The gov-
ernment] has not shown that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a 
substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting parties in these cases.”). 
 217 See, e.g., Jared Hatch, Comment, Requiring a Nexus to National Security: Immigration, “Terrorist Activities,” 
and Statutory Reform, 2014 BYU L. REV. 697, 732. 
 218 See generally Christine Ryan, Comment, Too Porous for Protection? Loopholes in EB-5 Investor Visa Oversight 
Are Cause for National Security Concern, 16 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 417 (2015). 
 219 See, e.g., Zachary Figueroa, Comment, Time to Rethink Cybersecurity Reform: The OPM Data Breach and 
the Case for Centralized Cybersecurity Infrastructure, 24 CATH. U. J. L. & TECH. 433, 435 (2016) (“The 
Federal Government must develop a system that more effectively allocates resources and cyberse-
curity expertise at home.”). 
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dent Trump’s executive order curtailing immigration from several predomi-
nantly Muslim countries.220  President Trump had signed this order on Jan-
uary 27, 2017, shortly after taking office.221  In her decision, Judge Brinkema 
noted that “[t]he ‘specific sequence of events’ leading to the adoption of the 
EO bolsters [Virginia]’s argument that the EO was not motivated by rational 
national security concerns.”222 Her determination that Virginia was likely to 
succeed on its claims that the order violated both the First and Fifth Amend-
ments rested on this “sequence of events” as well as what she called the 
“dearth of evidence indicating a national security purpose” in issuing the or-
der.223  Although the Trump Administration later revised the order, this de-
cision underscores the fact that federal immigration orders may no longer be 
based on the kind of central security concerns that animated the decision in 
Aguilar.224 
Similarly, the Trump Administration’s second executive order restricting 
travel to and from predominantly Muslim countries met with significant re-
sistance in part because it did not serve its stated aim.  In the amicus brief 
opposing that order signed by 162 technology companies, the amici noted 
that although the second order’s “express aim is to ‘protect the Nation from 
terrorist activities by foreign nationals,’” the provisions of the order do not 
serve that interest directly: “Yet the ban applies to literally millions of people 
who could not plausibly be foreign terrorists: hundreds of thousands of stu-
dents, employees, and family members of citizens who have been previously 
admitted to the United States, and countless peaceful individuals who are 
citizens of or born in the targeted countries.”225 
When applied to our individual claimants, the government’s least restric-
tive means may also be on shaky ground.  If our sanctuary taxi company was 
accused of transporting or harboring because it failed to bring undocumented 
individuals directly to U.S. security guards, the claimant might suggest there 
are other, less restrictive means for the government to enforce border security.  
For example, the government could hire more guards, increase the number 
of checkpoints, or create roadblocks at known points of entry.  It need not 
	
 220 Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, 726–27 (E.D. Va. 2017). 
 221 Id. at 727. 
 222 Id. at 736. 
 223 Id. at 726, 737. 
 224 In subsequent months, several other judicial orders have issued regarding travel restrictions imple-
mented by the Trump Administration.  On June 23, 2017, the Supreme Court allowed elements of 
a revised travel ban to go into effect for ninety days for individuals from Libya, Syria, Iran, Somalia, 
Yemen and Sudan who cannot establish a “credible claim of bona fide relationship” with either an 
entity or a person living in the U.S.  Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 
2083, 2088 (2017) (per curiam).  
 225 Brief of Technology Companies as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 22, Int’l Refugee As-
sistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, No. 17-1351 (4th Cir. 2017) (emphasis in original). 
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conscript individual taxi drivers into service as unpaid border agents.  
With regard to our restaurant owner who does not want to comply with 
the I-9 system, even if one assumes the government has a compelling interest 
in restricting the flow of illegal immigration, the fact that the I-9 system fur-
thers that aim is not sufficient.  The government must also show the I-9 sys-
tem is the least restrictive means of achieving that aim.  But surely an alter-
native is available to the government—rather than use the I-9 system, it could 
pour resources into additional security at the border, and stem illegal immigra-
tion that way.  It could also create an alternative screening method for deter-
mining an individual’s employment eligibility for corporations that believe 
complying with the I-9 system renders them complicit in an immigration sys-
tem that violates their religious beliefs.226  In the case of Wheaton College v. 
Burwell, a religious non-profit successfully argued that filling out a govern-
ment issued form regarding contraceptive coverage was itself a substantial 
burden because it would make the college complicit in the act of providing 
contraception.227  While the I-9 system may be efficient, or preferable, be-
cause it uses private resources rather than government resources to gather 
information, it is by no means less restrictive to our restaurant owner than a 
border security system based on surveillance and restriction of the physical, 
territorial border, or a federal verification system that did not require em-
ployer participation.228  
The same arguments might be applied to our software company.  Is an 
executive order limiting immigration from a short list of majority-Muslim 
countries the least restrictive means, as applied to our software company, of 
addressing terrorism?  Numerous exemptions to the visa system already ex-
ist—could one be created for the families of current employees?  Could al-
ternative vetting systems be a less restrictive means than a complete ban on 
immigration?  It seems hard to believe they would not.  In enjoining one 
version of the Trump Administration’s travel ban, the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals noted that the government had not established a sufficiently direct 
	
 226 Professor Amy Sepinwall provides an interesting examination of the concept of complicity post-
Hobby Lobby.  See generally Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemp-
tions in Hobby Lobby’s Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897 (2015).  
 227 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014).   
 228 The E-Verify system would be unlikely to relieve this complicity, as it still requires the employer to 
engage with the system and is known to have significant rates of error.  See WHAT IS E-VERIFY?, 
supra note 95; MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 97; Alex Nowrasteh, Don’t Reauthorize 
E-Verify, FEDERALIST (Jul. 14, 2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/07/14/dont-reauthorize-e-
verify/ (pointing to recent audits showing error rates of up to two percent for green card and visa 
holders); Perez, supra note 98.   
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connection between the individuals affected by the ban and any terrorist or-
ganizations that may exist in the countries that ban targeted.229  
e.  The Closely Held Corporation Limitation Is Not Truly Limiting 
The Hobby Lobby case recognized a right of free exercise for closely-held 
corporations, not all corporations.  It did not, however, rule out the latter.  
In response to HHS’s objections that it is difficult to determine the sincerely 
held beliefs of publicly traded corporations such as IBM or General Electric, 
the Court observed that such corporations were not at issue in the case before 
it.230  In addition, the Court noted, “it seems unlikely that the sort of corpo-
rate giants to which HHS refers will often assert RFRA claims.”231  This lan-
guage arguably narrows the scope of the ruling because it applies only to a 
subset of corporations.  Some scholars, however, have pointed out that the 
term “closely held,” as used by the Court, does not correlate precisely with 
the IRS definition of “closely held corporations.”232  Others argue that the 
impact of the Court’s ruling may have gone beyond that IRS definition to 
include, for example, S corporations.233  Hobby Lobby itself is registered as 
an S corporation.234  S corporations are growing steadily in the U.S., and 
increased in number from about 800,000 in 1986 to 4.2 million in 2011.235  
Traditional C corporations, in contrast, are decreasing in number.236  If 
Hobby Lobby is applied to S corporations as well as more narrowly defined 
closely-held corporations, the number of employers who might use RFRA to 
provide sanctuary now numbers in the millions and is growing steadily.  If 
corporate personhood continues to gain strength under U.S. law, as it did 
through the Hobby Lobby decision, then one can expect the religious rights of 
corporations to grow concurrently. 
In addition, the Supreme Court and/or Congress may well expand the 
	
 229 Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 772–73 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 230 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 (2014). 
 231 Id. 
 232 See, e.g., Jennifer S. Taub, Is Hobby Lobby a Tool for Limiting Corporate Constitutional Rights?, 30 CONST. 
COMMENT. 403, 417 (2015) (underscoring dissonance in the Court’s definition of closely held cor-
porations); see also Sean Nadel, Note, Closely Held Conscience: Corporate Personhood in the Post-Hobby 
Lobby World, 50 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 417, 428 (2017) (noting that the Hobby Lobby Court 
only differentiated closely-held corporations from publicly-traded ones, and observing that “there 
is very little in the Court’s syllogism that would easily confine the decision regarding standing to 
closely held corporations”). 
 233 Drew DeSilver, What Is a ‘Closely Held Corporation,’ Anyway, and How Many Are There?, PEW RES. CTR. 
(July 7, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/07/what-is-a-closely-held-corpo-
ration-anyway-and-how-many-are-there/. 
 234 Id. 
 235 William McBride, America’s Shrinking Corporate Sector, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 6, 2015), https://taxfoun-
dation.org/america-s-shrinking-corporate-sector/.   
 236 Id. 
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scope of RFRA in the future, potentially affecting even more employers and 
further expanding the scope of potential corporate sanctuary.  While the 
Hobby Lobby case concerns the closely-held corporations owned by the Hahn 
and Green families, the Supreme Court did not rule that only such corpora-
tions may use RFRA in the future.  There is a natural endpoint to this growth 
in the context of corporate religious freedom.  The larger the number of share-
holders, of course, the less likely it will be that the shareholders’ religious views 
will be homogeneous and identical to that deemed held by the corporation. 
3.  Sanctuary—A Viable Argument? 
The long history of prioritizing national security and rejecting sanctuary 
claims based on the traditional notion of sovereignty will prove a significant 
challenge to sanctuary corporations.  Yet our analysis suggests that if a court 
fairly applies Hobby Lobby and RFRA, a free exercise claim for corporate 
sanctuary must be taken seriously.  The introduction of the least restrictive 
means test has fundamentally altered the landscape of religious accommoda-
tion.  Government regulations that shift burdens from the government to 
individuals cannot simply be justified by their cost-effectiveness or efficiency, 
nor can the government defend them simply by reference to a desire for uni-
formity or a “slippery-slope” argument.  We argue that requiring taxi cab 
drivers to act as a putative border security agents, or requiring individual 
employers to file paperwork and check individuals’ citizenship documenta-
tion are not necessarily the least restrictive means of achieving government 
interests in national security and immigration control.  Rather, alternatives 
such as increased border security, checkpoints, and alternative documenta-
tion and verification systems could be established that would not burden in-
dividuals with religious convictions.  
Courts may be reluctant to interpret RFRA in a way that would extend 
corporations’ rights to provide sanctuary, given the history of judicial deci-
sions curbing sanctuary, and a strong tradition of affording deference to the 
government’s interest in national security in immigration contexts.  But it is 
crucial to recognize that RFRA’s statutory scheme should make it all but 
impossible for the government to shift regulatory, legal, or enforcement bur-
dens on individuals, without being prepared to show why it cannot take on 
those burdens itself.    
IV.  LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES AND SUGGESTIONS  
FOR FUTURE DISCUSSION 
If religious individuals can use RFRA, Hobby Lobby, and related case law 
to advance exemptions from laws related to the provision of contraceptives, 
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there is no reason those same arguments cannot be applied to traditionally 
liberal causes such as sanctuary, environmental protection, or protection of 
LGBT individuals.  Indeed, scholars have debated the extent to which Hobby 
Lobby might have opened the door to a wider range of religious exemptions 
from generally applicable laws.237  Some scholars envision an escalating “cul-
ture war” among those seeking religious exemptions.238  
First Amendment case law does appear to be trending in the direction of 
greater protection for religious claims.  In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. 
Comer,239 the Court considered whether a religious school should have been 
given the opportunity to apply for state grant funding for a playground resur-
facing project.240  The majority held that the Missouri Department of Natural 
Resource’s practice of excluding religious organizations from grant funding 
was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause because it denied a religious or-
ganization access to an “otherwise generally available public benefit pro-
gram” solely on the basis of its religious status.241  Put another way, the Court’s 
opinion requires that any public benefit, including direct funding, provided to 
non-religious organizations be made equally available to religious organiza-
tions.  As Justice Sotomayor points out in her dissent, the majority opinion 
goes so far as to reject any balancing or consideration of the state’s antiestab-
lishment tradition or interest.242  Indeed, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch would 
have extended the holding even further, calling into doubt previous precedent 
that permitted the state to deny funding that was to be used for an express 
religious purpose.243  This trend toward greater protection of religious organ-
izations and their claims of religious freedom may well create momentum in 
lower courts to continue to stretch free exercise claims.244  
	
 237 Compare Eric Rassbach, Is Hobby Lobby Really A Brave New World? Litigation Truths About Religious 
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 239 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).  
 240 Id. at 2017. 
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There certainly are other liberal causes with both religious and secular 
support where the former may be used in conjunction with RFRA to achieve 
ends that the latter may not.  For example, the Dakota Access Pipeline, the 
subject of extensive political controversy, was also the subject of a RFRA 
claim by two Native American tribes.245  In February 2017, the Cheyenne 
River Sioux and the Standing Rock Sioux moved for a temporary restraining 
order to block construction of the pipeline because such construction would 
interfere with the exercise of their religion.246  Invoking RFRA, the tribes 
claimed that the pipeline’s construction would “unbalance and desecrate the 
water and render it impossible for the Lakota to use that water in their Inipi 
ceremony.”247  The Court denied their motion because it found that the 
tribes had waited too long to raise their religious concerns.248  Additionally, 
some citizens have expressed religious as well as moral objections to getting 
rid of environmental regulations in general.249  
Empirical research suggests that liberals and conservatives have different 
moral foundations and priorities.250  Whereas liberals prioritize a moral no-
tion of care/harm and fairness/reciprocity, conservatives, while not disre-
garding these notions, also equally consider loyalty, authority/respect, and 
purity.251  This may explain in part the tractability of the so-called “culture 
wars,”252 and the role that RFRA has come to play in those wars.253  If con-
servatives and liberals act out of different moral foundations, it seems logical 
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that their religious convictions (if they label their moral convictions as “reli-
gious”) would also vary.  
If RFRA is interpreted appropriately, it can serve to protect both liberal 
and conservative religious values, yet in doing so, it also sets up the potential 
for direct conflict between the two.  For every conservative corporation that 
seeks to avoid providing contraception, there may be a liberal corporation—
or liberal employee—that feels religiously compelled to offer it.  For every 
conservative corporation that refuses to serve gay couples, there may well be 
a liberal corporation or employee that is committed to honoring them.  And 
what happens if a liberal pharmaceutical company feels religiously compelled 
to provide marijuana to individuals seeking relief from pain, while a con-
servative attorney general seeks to cut off access, even in the medical context? 
These conflicts are precisely what late Justice Antonin Scalia sought to 
avoid in deciding Smith.  As he stated in that case, “[P]recisely because we 
value and protect . . . religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of 
deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regu-
lation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.”254  
This concern also animated his belief that RFRA went beyond constitutional 
protection for the free expression of religion as intended by the Founders:  
In fact, the most plausible reading of the “free exercise” enactments . . . is a 
virtual restatement of Smith: Religious exercise shall be permitted so long as it 
does not violate general laws governing conduct. . . . This limitation upon the scope 
of religious exercise would have been in accord with the background political 
philosophy of the age (associated most prominently with John Locke), which 
regarded freedom as the right “to do only what was not lawfully prohib-
ited.”255 
Though a corporation’s RFRA defense to a sanctuary claim may well be 
denied by a court that prioritizes national security over religious freedom, 
our analysis of this claim reveals the potential for RFRA to tear at the fabric 
of civil society.  If we must consider the interest of a particular plaintiff in 
following immigration and employment laws, and can only enforce them if 
they represent the least restrictive means of carrying out a compelling gov-
ernment mandate, what of the hundreds of laws affecting the basic rules for 
corporate behavior?  While commentators tend to focus on the big-ticket 
laws—particularly discrimination and taxes—what about the less controver-
sial ones?  What about laws requiring corporations to meet basic safety stand-
	
likely lead to a retrenchment by courts of protection for religious freedom).  
 254 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S 872, 888 (1990) (emphasis in original).  
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ards, or requiring transparency in securities disclosures?  Could a RFRA ex-
emption apply to insider trading?  What about OSHA regulations on work-
ing conditions?  
While the Hobby Lobby opinion goes out of its way to explain how prohi-
bitions on racial discrimination and the requirement to pay taxes are nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest, commentators 
have noted that this sweeping proclamation might not, in fact, hold up logi-
cally against a challenge to Title VII by religious white separatists,256 or to 
tax laws by Quakers.257  Indeed, given that RFRA requires an individual 
analysis of the compelling state interest and least restrictive means test as ap-
plied to the particular plaintiff, it would be impossible for the Court to reject 
claims based on such a generalization.258  
In the new RFRA era, religious beliefs have been prioritized over secular, 
non-religious beliefs and generally applicable civil and criminal law.  Simply 
by labeling a belief religious, a person can avoid any number of statutes and 
regulations, whereas sincerely held moral beliefs lacking religious foundation 
have no corresponding protection.  If this sounds like an Establishment Clause 
problem, it might be, except that it does not give preferences to any particular 
religion—it simply preferences religious people above non-religious people.  
Take the case of Apple, which sought in 2016 to avoid an FBI demand 
that it create a “backdoor” to the iPhone to allow the FBI to access data on 
the phones of individuals responsible for a terrorist attack in San Bernar-
dino.259  Prior to the FBI demand, Apple had a history of making privacy a 
	
 256 See Martin, supra note 171, at 26–28 (arguing Title VII already includes certain exceptions, and an 
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Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006)).  
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core value of the company—CEO Tim Cook even called privacy a “funda-
mental human right.”260  He had not called privacy a religious value, but 
what if he had?  Could that have been the basis to avoid the FBI’s demand?  
If so, wouldn’t it be prudent for a company such as Apple to designate these 
deeply held, core values as “religious”?  We do not here suggest Apple would 
have to make a false claim for religious protection.  It simply would appro-
priate a word (“religious”) used to refer to one type of deeply held values to 
refer to a different type of deeply held values.  
The Court’s jurisprudence when it comes to defining “religion” is less 
than clear.261  While the Court has consistently distinguished non-religious 
values from religious ones, it has nonetheless provided no clear boundaries 
for determining the difference.262  In Torcaso v. Watkins,263 the Court made 
clear that “religion” need not be theistic or include a belief “in the existence 
of God.”264  The key may lie in the role that a set of beliefs plays for the 
individual: if it holds a similarly important place to the individual as might a 
traditional religion, it may be considered religion.265  There certainly is no 
bar in the Court’s jurisprudence for a religious belief system based on funda-
mental human rights, equality, and care, even if it expressly disavows a god.  
In the end, for liberal corporations seeking to protect fundamental human 
rights and core values, it may require adopting the language of religion to 
ensure protection equivalent to that currently enjoyed by white supremacists.  
CONCLUSION 
We believe that the judicial language and reasoning used in Hobby Lobby 
provides a substantial basis to argue that federal law now supports the con-
cept of a sanctuary corporation.  Sanctuary corporations might shelter an 
increasingly vulnerable immigrant population in a number of ways, some of 
which are already occurring in various parts of the country.  The long history 
of religious affiliation with those who provide sanctuary for “outsiders,” to-
	
 260 Apple CEO Tim Cook: ‘Privacy Is A Fundamental Human Right,’ NPR (Oct. 1, 2015, 6:17PM), 
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gether with the recent resurgence of a sanctuary movement in the U.S., sug-
gests that corporations may have a greater constitutional right than ever be-
fore to object to certain immigration enforcement policies that conflict with 
their religious beliefs.  While the application of RFRA in this novel context 
will be challenging to many courts, and represent a departure from earlier 
case law, the intellectually honest application of RFRA, as clarified by Hobby 
Lobby, may provide greater scope for the religious exercise of providing sanc-
tuary than previously discussed.  
